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JURISDICTION OF FLORIDA SUPREME COURT
INTRODUCTION

The practical aspects of "justice" to most citizens mean speedier, less coslj
and more conclusive adjudications of property and liberty rights. To achieve
these objectives, the chief justice of the Supreme Court of Florida in 1978 appointed a commission to study judicial reform in the state's appellate system,
including jurisdictional changes for the Florida Supreme Court.
The efforts of the commission and many others culminated on March 11,
1980, when the voters of Florida were given the opportunity to approve an
amendment to Florida's Constitution which would redefine the jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court of Florida.' Believing the amendment would eliminate
delay and costs in appellate proceedings, and expedite the careful resolution of
important decisions emanating from the supreme court, the voters overwhelmingly adopted this constitutional amendment.
Principally this article explores the extent to which the voters' etxpectations
have been or will be met by their adoption of the 1980 amendment to article V
of the Florida Constitution. A subsidiary purpose is to chronicle th history of
this amendment, identify reference sources for later use in construing, the
amendment, and suggest procedures and rules which should be established to
effect the framers' and the voters' wills.
Properly understood and implemented, the 1980 amendment potentially
offers an effective, expeditious appellate system geared to the uniqueness of
Florida's judiciary. Dedicated appellate jurists, a cooperative appellate bar, and
a vigilant public are necessary to assure the efficacy of the amendment. Principal
responsibility for the success or failure of the intended changes, however, rests
squarely on the seven members of the Florida Supreme Court. Their construction and application of the amendment, particularly in its formative years, will
either realize or frustrate the voters' hopes for a new day in Florida appellate
justice.

I. ESTA LISHING THE RoLE OF rHm SuPREmE COURT OF
FLOREDA: 1851-1957
From 1851, when a permanent supreme court with three justices was estab-

lished, until 1957, the state experienced a growing number of civil and criminal
courts of record.2 Various means were devised to enable the high tribunal to
1. See appendix A for the full text of this amendment. Unless otherwise noted, all materials cited in this article are available in the Florida Supreme Court Library,, Supreme Court
Building, Tallahassee, Florida 32804.
Other major appellate court reforms had been suggested by the Appellate, Structure Commission and were adopted in 1979. These reforms included: the creation of a new appellate
district and district court of appeal for Florida, see In re The Creation of The District Court
of Appeal, Fifth District, 374 So. 2d 972 (Fla. 1979); the establishment of eleven new district
court judgeships, see 1979 Fla. Laws, ch. 79-413 § 3; the adoption of an en banc hearing and
rehearing rule for the district courts of appeal, see In re Rule 9.331, Determination of Causes
by a District Court of Appeal En Banc, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, 574 So. 2d 992
(Fla.), modified, 377 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 1979); and the elimination of direct supreme court review
of workmen's compensation cases, see 1979 Fla. Laws, ch. 79-312, § 1.
2. See F A. CoNsr. art. V, § 1 (1838), for the court's former appellate jurisdiction..
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review cases appealed from these courts. At various times the court relied on
commissioners, was expanded in size, or sat in separate panels or divisions to
manage the increasing number of appeals. 3
In 1954, the Judicial CouncilP established a task force to study the appellate
system and to consider "the question of intermediate courts to hear and determine appeals in the usual cases, at or near the source, not only to diminish
the cost but also to curtail the docket of the supreme court where appeals are
being filed at the rate of more than one thousand each year." 5 The task force
intended to enable the supreme court to sit en banc for oral arguments and
decisions in all cases within its jurisdiction. Additionally, the task force sought
to restrict supreme court appellate jurisdiction so "that there might not be any
possibility of merely offering two appeals, one to the district court of appeal and
one to the Supreme Court, and thereby making litigation even more costly and
prolonged."
With these objectives in mind, the Council recommended that more than
two-thirds of the appeals jurisdiction of the supreme court (then over approximately 1,300 cases) be shifted to three district courts of appeal, each composed
of three judges. Applying the 1954 statistics, the supreme court would retain
jurisdiction over 7 capital cases, 40 constitutional appeals, 6 certified questions,
18 railroad commission cases, 49 workmen's compensation cases, 117 original
matters, and varying numbers of bar admission or discipline petitions, advisory
opinion requests, and constitutional writs, not to exceed approximately 450
cases in the aggregate. 7 In 1956, the Council's suggestions to divide appeals between the supreme court and the newly created district courts were endorsed by
The Florida Bar, approved by the legislature, and ratified by the voters.8
II.

THE DEVELOPING DILEMMA:

1957-1977

A. Classes of Jurisdiction
The 1956 Constitution assigned the court essentially three classes of jurisdiction- mandatory, discretionary, and constitutional writs. The courts "mandatory" jurisdiction, which encompassed a narrower class of cases after the 1956
constitutional amendment, was further limited by the 1980 amendment. It
consists, generally, of those cases for which the court provides plenary review that is, the court must accept and render a decision on the merits in these pre3. See A. MoMs, FLORIDA HANDBOOK 224 (17th ed. 1979-80).
4. The Judicial Council of Florida was created by 1953 Fla. Laws, ch. 28062, which now
appears as FLA. STAT. § 43.15 (1979). Although an active leader in judicial reform when it was
created, the Council had little to do with judicial reform in Florida after 1972. The fact that
no appellate justices or judges have been appointed to the Judicial Council by recent governors, and the gradual shift of judicial data collection functions to the Office of the State
Courts Administrator explain the court's frequent use of ad hoc study commissions such as
the Appellate Structure Commission. See notes 28-30 and accompanying text, infra. The
Judicial Council was abolished by the 1980 Legislature. H.B. 1777 (Reg. Sess. 1980).
5.

FiRsT ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF FLORIDA at 5-6 (June 30, 1954).

6. Id. at 14.
7.

See SECOND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF FLORIDA at 2-3 (June 30, 1955).

8.

FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF FLORIDA at 3 (June 30, 1957).
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scribed cases. The court's "discretionary" jurisdiction was created in 1956 for
designated classes of cases - a form of structured, supervisory review - which
the 1980 amendment continues. Generally, discretionary jurisdiction cases offer
the court an opportunity to accept or reject for substantive consideration those
cases presumed sufficiently important for supreme court resolution.
A third category, properly characterized as discretionary but more frequently described as the court's "writ" jurisdiction, authorizes the court to
consider extraordinary requests to accelerate or halt some action of a statewide
commission or an inferior court. The court's writ jurisdiction is extraordinary
in that it is not a substitute for a direct appeal, 9 and other forms of relief
typically must be unavailable in another forum.1 0 Because the 1980 amendment
has left the court's writ jurisdiction virtually unchanged, the amendment's
background and effects are conveniently discussed in terms of the first two of
these general jurisdictional categories.
B. Expansion of the Classes
Although the 1956 amendment contemplated that the court's jurisdiction
would be relatively narrow, the supreme court itself created two exceptions to
its restricted role. The exceptions severely flawed the court's ability to perform
the constitutional role which had been selected for the Court by the people.
Both exceptions, in fact, contributed to a dilemma which was accurately predicted by dissenting members of the court at the time they were adopted. Both,
it developed, impeded the court's later efforts to identify and explain the causes
of delay and a rapidly increasing backlog of cases.The constitution mandated the review of orders or decisions which "directly" passed on the validity of a statute, whether from trial courts or from
district courts of appeal. The court, however, in 1959, adopted a policy of re
viewing cases in which a challenge to the validity of a statute was not necessarily identified in the lower court's decision, but rather was only "inherent"
in the court's ultimate action. In Harrell's Candy Kitchen, Inc. v. SarasotaManatee Airport Authority,12 the court assumed jurisdiction over a zoning case
based on an assertion in the trial court that the statute creating the zoning
board was invalid. Although the central issue at trial was the validity of a
height limitation on buildings near a runway, a majority of the court accepted
direct appellate jurisdiction because the statutory creation of the board was
approved "inherently." The dissenting opinion of Justice Thomas described
the so-called "doctrine of inherency" as "a usurpation of the power of the

District Court of Appeals."' s
In effect, this early expansion of the constitution's directive potentially
provided for direct review in the supreme court of all criminal cases, where a
statute necessarily underpins a criminal charge and can always be attacked as

9. Jenkins v. Wainwright, 322 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 1975).
10. See, e.g., Shevin ex rel. State v. Public Sen'. Comm'n, 333 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1976) (mandamus); State ex rel. Turner v. Earle, 295 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1974) (prohibition).

11. These efforts are discussed in detail in section HI infra.
12. 111 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 1959).
13. Id. at 445 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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invalid, and of a majority of civil cases in which statutory rights are applied.
The court's adoption of and continued adherence to the inherency doctrine
thus created a procedure by which attorneys could bypass the district courts of
appeal. In effect, it judicially authorized forum-shopping.
The second, more devastating exception to a restrictive view of the court's
jurisdictional limitations was announced in the 1965 decision of Foley v. Weaver
Drugs, Inc.14 Foley began with a trial court complaint for damages as a result
of injuries sustained in 1959. The court granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of one of the defendants and the district court affirmed without
opinion. 15 Two years later, the supreme court responded to a petition seeking
certiorari review based on an alleged conflict with another district court's
opinion by temporarily relinquishing jurisdiction and requesting the district
court to "prepare and adopt an opinion setting forth the theory and reasoning
upon which a decision in this cause is reached .
1.6."1,1
The dissenters called the
procedure "a distortion of the provisions of the constitution and an arrogation
17
by this Court of power it does not possess."'
The district court refused to comply with the request to prepare an opinion,
noting that supreme court jurisdiction is supplied by a conflict of decision, not
of opinions or reasons. The court also refused to reconsider the cause because
after two years, the panel members might be unable to recall the disclosures in
the record and arguments, the law might have changed, and the results of
reconsideration could only be permeated with uncertainty and instability. The
district court concluded that the plaintiffs had no cause of action against one of
the defendants under either theory of the complaint, and returned the cause to
the supreme court to discern the reasons for its decision from the early afflrmance.' 8 The supreme court's second review of Foley, approving the district
court's decision on the merits, demonstrated the court's willingness to accept
for review cases without written opinions by the district court. It also created
the concept of "record proper" - defined as "the written record of the proceedings in the court under review except the report of the testimony" - as a basis
to ascertain the source of alleged direct conflicts in the decisions of the district
courts.1 9

Foley had a tremendous impact on the number of cases filed in the court,
producing an attitude among attorneys that a district court decision was never
final. Thus, practitioners began to perceive the court's conflict jurisdiction as a
mechanism by which to seek review of any district court decision. The increased
number of filings necessitated a two-step screening process within the court.
Files in conflict jurisdiction cases circulated to a minimum of five justices'
offices at least twice - once for a vote on jurisdiction, and a second time either
for an often sought rehearing on a denial or, if certiorari was granted, for a
decision on the merits.
14. 177 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 1965).
15. Foley v. Weaver Drugs, Inc., 146 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1962).

16. Foley v. Weaver Drugs, Inc., 168 So. 2d 749, 750 (Fla. 1964).
17. Id. at 751.
18. Foley v. Weaver Drugs, Inc., 172 So. 2d 907, 909 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1965).
19. 177 So. 2d 221, 225 (Fla. 1965).
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Although the court's caseload slowly grew from 482 filings in 1958 to 1,288
filings by 1972,20 court reform efforts in the early 1970s did not identify the
supreme court's jurisdiction as a problem when the judicial structure of the
state underwent critical analysis in 1971-1972. Reformers, including the court
itself, concentrated on the need to consolidate and establish uniform jurisdiction for trial courts. (An attitude also lingered among some justices21 and
commentators 2 that, unlike the court's pre-1957 predicament, the court could
at any time relieve its growing caseload merely by overruling its decisions in
Harrell'sCandy Kitchen and in Foley.)
Internal efforts were made to cope with the court's rising caseload. The
court expedited procedures to screen appeals, limited oral arguments to cases
where the court deemed them essential rather than those in which argument
was requested by counsel, sat in five-man panels on many cases orally argued,
and created a pool of attorneys to summarize certiorari petitions. The court
attempted to distinguish substantial from insubstantial questions of constitutional construction and statutory validity. 23 The court wrestled with extensions
of the Foley doctrine to decisional conflicts created by dicta, 24 dissenting
opinions,25 and concurring opinions. 26 It also struggled with efforts to enlarge
the doctrine of "record proper" to include statements by the trial judge, deposi27
tions, and testimony.

III.

FAsmONING A SOLUION:

1977-1979

The mistaken impression that internal devices alone could alleviate the

court's problem was finally corrected in the spring of 1979. Review of the data
revealed by a commission appointed to study Florida's appellate structure indicated that alternative devices were necessary.
28
In his 1978 Report to the Legislature, then Chief Justice Ben Overton
20. Statistics obtained from the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Florida.
For an analysis of the detrimental effects of this increasing caseload on the quality of
appellate justice, see England & McMahon, Quantity Discounts in Appellate Justice, 60 Jan.

442 (1977).
21. See generally Letter from Justices of the Supreme Court of Florida to Talbot
":
D'Alemberte, Chairman, Florida Constitution Revision Commission (Nov. 16, 1977).
22. See generally Commentary, Establishing New Criteria for Conflict Certiorari in Per
Curiam District Court Decisions: A First Step Toward a Definition of Power, 29 U. FIA. L.
Rnv. 335 (1977); Comment, Conflict Certiorari:Is the Supreme Court of Florida Following its
ConstitutionalMandate?, 32 U. MIAMI L. Rv. 435 (1977); Note, The Erosion of FinalJurisdiction in Florida'sDistrict Courts of Appeal, 21 U. FIA. L. Rav. 375 (1969).
23. See Simmons v. State, 354 So. 2d 1211 (Fla. 1978), discussed in Borgognoni & Keane,
PracticeBefore the Supreme Court of Florida:A PracticalAnalysis, 8 STrsON INrrA. L. REv.
318, 330-36 (1979). See also Jordan v. State, 334 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 1976).

24.
25.
26.
27.

See note 248 infra.
See note 246 infra.
See note 247 infra.
See State ex rel. Ranalli v. Johnson, 277 So. 2d 24, 25 (Fla. 1973); AB CTC v.

Morejon, 324 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1974); Commerce Nat'1 Bank v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 284

So. 2d 205 (Fla. 1973).
28. Justice Overton served as chief justice from March 1, 1976 through June 30g,1978. The
members of the supreme court elect one justice to serve as chief justice. FLA. CONSr. art. V,
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recommended the creation of a commission with a broad based participation to
determine the need for an additional district court and to consider district
29
court rather than supreme court review of workmen's compensation cases. In
the summer of 1978, newly-elected Chief Justice Arthur England implemented
Justice Overton's recommendation by appointing an Appellate Structure Commission chaired by Justice Overton and composed of district, circuit and county
court judges, legislators, laymen and members of the bar. Justice England expanded the scope of the commission's inquiry, however, to include a review of
the entire appellate system in light of the 1956 goal "to ensure that the district
courts of appeal are courts of final appellate review as contemplated by Article
V of the Constitution.""0
In response to its expanded duty, the commission analyzed each category of
the supreme court's jurisdiction to determine if the encompassed cases were
significant or important enough to justify the attention of a then overloaded
state high court. Tentative votes at the October 12, 1978, meeting indicated that
ideally, mandatory jurisdiction should be restricted to death penalty cases,
decisions invalidating statutes or construing the constitution, and bond validationsY1 Nonetheless, after six months of work, the commission rejected constitutional change to achieve this goal and recommended only that the supreme
court's jurisdiction be modified by statute and by rule. In light of the overwhelming defeat of all constitutional reforms, the commission feared that legislative and voter approval of an amendment to the constitution would be
virtually impossible.32
After weeks of intense internal discussion and numerous drafts of proposed
changes within the court, the chief justice, on behalf of a unanimous court,
presented virtually every aspect of the commission's recommendations for appellate court reforms to the 1979 legislature. The most notable exception was
the court's rejection of the commission's proposal to alter the jurisdiction of the
supreme court solely by rule and by statute. 3 The court viewed the commission's data as conclusive of the need for a constitutional adjustment and it
refused to deny the voters of Florida the right to refine the jurisdictional role
which the constitution had created in 1956.
For the first time, the commission's statistics had demonstrated that the
court's growing problems were not (as generally believed) attributable to the
court's liberality in accepting cases for review, but rather to the ramifications
§ 2(b). Traditionally, a chief justice is elected for two years beginning in July of each evennumbered year. Sup. CT. MANUAL OF INTER. OPER. PROC. art. I, § B.
29. 1978 Report to the Legislature, submitted by Chief Justice Ben F. Overton, to the
Florida Legislature.
30. In re Commission on The Florida Appellate Court Structure, (filed July 26, 1978, as
amended Aug. 15, 1978 and Nov. 28, 1978), app. F.
31. Minutes of the Supreme Court Commission on Florida Appellate Court Structure,
Oct. 12, 1978 [hereinafter cited as Appellate Structure Commission minutes] at app. E.
32. See Tapes of the Supreme Court Commission on Florida Appellate Court Structure,
Nov. 16, 1978 [hereinafter cited as Appellate Structure Commission tapes].
33. 1979 Report on the Florida Judiciary, submitted by Chief Justice Arthur J. England,
Jr., to the Florida Legislature, April 1979, reprinted in 53 FLA. B.J. 296 (1979) [hereinafter

cited as 1979 Report].
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of its constitutionally assigned mandatory jurisdiction and the numbers of
cases being brought as a result, among others, of the Foley doctrine. The commission found that "the Court has in reality exercised great restraint in accepting for review the cases over which it has any freedom of choice" and "granted
[discretionary petitions] in less than 5 percent of the cases...."I
A second exception was the court's rejection of the commission's recommendation that the supreme court screen statutory validity and constitutional
construction cases for substantiality. The court regarded this as a circumvention
of the constitution. Additionally, the device would prove to be inefficient, requiring another screening procedure in the court and shuttling seemingly
insubstantial cases between the dockets of two successive courts.
The court proposed a constitutional amendment in April 1979, filed as
Senate Joint Resolution 714 (SJR 714),35 for consideration at the 1979 regular
session of the Florida Legislature. The court's proposal limited the categories of
mandatory review to death penalty cases, bond validation proceedings, and district court decisions expressly passing on the validity of a statute or expressly
construing a constitutional provision. The court's discretionary jurisdiction
under SJR 714 was predicated on district court certifications of decisions in conflict or of questions of great public importance, plus a "safeguard" provision
authorizing the supreme court, on its own initiative, to reach down and obtain
for review trial court orders-and district court decisions which had substantial
importance and required immediate statewide resolution.
The Judicial Council endorsed and supported SJR 714.36 Under pressure
to accept or reject the court's proposal on very short notice, however, the Board
of Governors of The Florida Bar by a vote of eighteen for and twelve against
failed to endorse SJR 714 with the two-thirds vote required by the Board's bylaws. 37 The members of the Board objected to SJR 714 principally because
attorney-filed petitions for conffict certiorari review were eliminated, and because the initiative, or so-called "reach down" provision, did not appear to
allow attorney-filed suggestions to the court.
During two Senate Judiciary-Civil Committee hearings Justice Alan Sundberg,38 on behalf of the court, explained the need to limit mandatory jurisdiction. Despite the court's expressed intent to limit severely the exercise of the
safeguard or "reach down" provision, that provision was ridiculed by opponents
of SJR 714 as "pluck up" power which would destroy finality in all cases
throughout the judicial system.3 9 Opposition to SJR 714 also developed from

34. 53 FLA. B.J. at 298.
35.

Fla. SJ. Res. 714 (Reg. Sess. 1979, introduced by S. Hair) reprinted in 53 FL-. B.J.

304 (1979).
36, Twenty-Fifth Annual Report of the Judicial Council of Florida at 7-9 (Feb. 1, 1980).
As noted later, its chairman publicly opposed constitutional reform. See note 58 and accompanying text, infra.
37. Fla. Bar Integr. Rules By laws, art. VI, § 2. See Minutes of the Florida Bar Board of
Governors meeting, April 18, 1979 (available from The Florida Bar).
38. Justice Sundberg was elected to serve as chief justice for a two year term commencing
July 1, 1980.
39. Proposed Amendment to Section 3, Article " of the State Constitution: Tapes of
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attorneys who expressed a lack of trust in district court judges' ability or willingness to recognize, concede, and certify conflicting decisions. SJR 714 was
then withdrawn from further consideration during the 1979 regular session, in
order to give the court an opportunity to discuss alternatives with opponents
and critics and to seek a consensus substitute in time for an announced special
legislative session in the fall of 1979.40 No comparable bill was introduced into
the House of Representatives, and no House committee considered the court's
recommendations.
Notwithstanding the fate of SJR 714, the court gained support for its position that structural change was essential to avoid a potential decline in the
quality of its work and increasing backlogs and delays. In an effort to review
the controversial aspects of the court's original proposal, Justice Sundberg
scheduled a series of meetings with a committee 41 appointed by the president
of The Florida Bar. Eventually the bar committee and Justice Sundberg
drafted a statement of agreed principles42 to advise the bar's Board of Governors and the court of a consensus that could be reached. This included a
proposal to retain discretionary review of written opinions of district courts
invoked by attorney-filed petitions asserting decisional conflict. The bar committee made clear its intent to overrule the Foley decision regarding conflict,
however, by declaring that only an opinion which "articulates a rule of law..
should qualify for discretionary review.
To replace the much-maligned "reach down" provision, the bar committee
recommended a mechanism for direct supreme court review of some trial court
orders which required immediate resolution. Designed to allow a bypass of the
district courts, this procedure would be initiated by certification of the cause
by the chief judge of the judicial circuit. The bar committee also suggested
that the court propose more severe limitations on mandatory appeals than the
court itself had originally proposed, recommending that district court decisions
upholding the validity of statutes be reviewed on a discretionary rather than
a mandatory basis. Finally, at the urging of attorneys Tobias Simon and others
who feared too severe a narrowing of the court's review authority, the bar
committee presented an alternative plan for discretionary review of "decisions
of a district court of appeal which substantially affect the general public interest
or the proper administration of justice throughout the state" - a standard
based on the American Bar Association model for constitutionally unlimited
43
discretionary review.
After the bar's deliberations, Justice Overton reconvened the Appellate
Structure Commission to review the bar committee's statement of principles.
At its meeting on September 5, 1979, the commission agreed that mandatory
Hearings on SJ. Res. 714 Before the Senate Judiciary-CivilCommittee, 6th Legis., Reg. Sess.,
May 3, 1979 [hereinafter cited as Senate Committee Hearingson S.J. Res. 714].
40. Id.
41. The members of the Select Committee of The Florida Bar were: Benjamin Redding,
Chairman; Edwin C. Cluster, Vice-Chairman; Gerald Brown, Talbot D'Alemberte, C. Harris
Dittmar, Charles C. Edwards, Timothy A. Johnson, Jr., David V. Kerns, and N. David Korones.
42. Special Committee to Study Supreme Court Jurisdiction, The Florida Bar, Statement
of Principles (Sept. 12, 1979), app. D.
43. ABA Standards Relating to Appellate Courts § 3.00 (1977).
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jurisdiction should be limited more severely than the court had proposed in
SJR 714, but it disagreed with the bar committee's preferential guidelines for
discretionary review. At the urging of commission member Tobias Simon, the
commission opted for the alternative - constitutionally unlimited discretionary
review - to be restricted by the court's adoption of rules setting guidelines for
its own exercise of discretion.44
An important suggestion emerged from the commission's review of the
proposed "bypass" mechanism. Rather than having circuit court chief judges
certify causes in need of immediate resolution by the supreme court, the commission recommended that the district courts themselves certify those special
cases after the filing of an appeal in their court. The commissioners perceived
the advantage under this procedure of collecting like cases from the various
circuits within the district for consolidated supreme court review.
On September 15, 1979, the bar committee formally presented its principles
to the Board of Governors through the committee's chairman, attorney Benjamin Redding of Panama City. Tobias Simon argued for the alternative,
commission-approved approach of constitutionally unlimited discretionary review. The members of the Board of Governors, at the request of Justice
Sundberg, agreed to support a court proposal for constitutional change based
either on the committee's principles or the alternative. 41
As the court prepared to submit a proposed substitute for SJR 714 to the
November special legislative session, the chairman of the American Bar Association's Committee to Implement Standards of Judicial Administration expressed an interest in Florida's court reform effort and chose Tallahassee as the
site for the next scheduled ABA Committee meeting. The ABA Committee's
national expertise with appellate courts focused, in accordance with the ABA
standards, on constitutionally unlimited discretionary review for the supreme
court. In discussions with legislative committee members, the court and the
bar, the ABA Committee members recognized unusual features in the Florida
system. Florida's judiciary is unique with the large number of appeals (35 per
year) filed in death penalty cases, each requiring full record and sentence review, compared with only eight cases per year in the state with the next highest
volume. The ABA Committee also noted the special concern for constitutional
conffict resolution jurisdiction, due to the diversity in geographical regions of
the state. These and other unique factors, the Committee concluded, adequately
explained Florida's proposed deviation from the ABA's model standard of constitutionally unlimited discretionary review. A majority of the ABA Committee
left Tallahassee satisfied with the consideration of ABA standards which had

gone into Florida's court reform effort. 46
Only two issues in the proposal were very controversial when the combined
Senate-House Judiciary Committees met to consider the court's new constitutional amendment during the three day special session. The first was the court's
suggestion to remove from the selection of supreme court justices the constitu44. See Letter from Tobias Simon to Justice Overton (Sept. 6, 1979), at app. E.
45. See Minutes of the Florida Bar Board of Governors meeting, Sept. 15, 1979 (available

from The Florida Bar).
46. Court CaseloadAmazes Experts, Today, Nov, 16, 1979, 4t 8B, col. 3.
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tional restriction which required appellate district representation on the court.
The Senate committee voted to retain the district selection requirement in that
committee's draft resolution, Senate Joint Resolution 20-C (SJR 20-C) and the
selection reform issue immediately died at that juncture.4 7 The other publicly
controversial issue concerned a proposal to transfer review from the supreme
court to the district courts of appeal of most public utility decisions. The House
and Senate committees determined, however, in accordance with an understanding between the court and major utilities, that only those Public Service Commission cases relating to rates and services of electric, gas, and telephone utilities
were appropriate for initial review in the supreme court because these frequently affected segments of the population in service areas larger than the
territory of any of the five appellate districts. Other Commission matters, such
as those affecting transportation and water and sewer companies, were deemed
suitable for initial review in one or more district courts of appeal in the manner that other agencies' actions were reviewable under Florida's Administrative
Procedure Act.48 The court's proposal, SJR 20-C, emerged from committees of
both chambers of the legislature in essentially the form suggested by the court,
49
as derived from the bar committee's statement of principles.
At the request of the sheriffs' and clerks' associations, the Judiciary-Civil
Committee chairman introduced an amendment on the floor of the Senate to
retain discretionary review of district court decisions affecting a class of constitutional or state officers, 50 a provision which had been proposed for deletion
by the court and the bar committee. The court and the associations' representatives had agreed that the amendment was acceptable, so long as district court
decisions in this category, as in all others, "expressly" dealt with either of the
classes. The Senate also amended SJR 20-C to delete any mention of the Public
Service Commission, preferring to avoid naming any particular agency in the
constitution and selecting the term "statewide agencies" based on an explanation for that term by the chairman of the sponsoring committee. 51
SJR 20-C, as amended, was adopted by the Senate by a vote of 38 to 2 on
November 28, together with a companion bill (SR 21-C) to accelerate submission
to the voters by allowing the proposed amendment to be considered at the
special presidential primary election scheduled for March 11, 1980.52 Immedi47. Proposed Amendment to Section 3, Article V of the State Constitution: Tapes of
Hearings on S.J. Res. 20-C Before the Senate Judiciary-Civil Committee, 6th Legis., Spec. C
Sess., Nov. 26, 1979 [hereinafter cited as Senate Committee Hearingson SJ. Res. 20-C].
48. Id.
49. See app. D.
50. Journal of the Senate, 6th Legis., Spec. C Sess., Nov. 28, 1979, at 11; app. C.
51. Id. at 12-13.
52. Id. at 12. Art. XI, § 5(a) of the Florida Constitution requires a three-fourths vote of
each house of the legislature in order to authorize voting on a constitutional amendment
before the next regularly scheduled general election, which in this case would have been held
in November 1980. On March 11, 1980, the special presidential election would be held and
provided an opportunity to submit other matters for the voter's consideration. One other constitutional proposal previously scheduled concerned an increase of the homestead exemption
of property-owners for school tax purposes. See Journal of the House of Representatives, 6th
Legis., Spec. Sess., June 6, 1979, at 2-3. Like the court reform proposal, it also received overwhelming (69%) voter approval.
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ately following the vote in the Senate, both measures were certified to the
House, substituted for comparable House legislation, and adopted without
further amendment by a vote of 110 to 2.53

IV. ADOPTION

OF THE

1980 AMENDMENT: NOVEMBER

1979-MARc 1980
During the period between November 28, 1979 and March 11, 1980, active
public support for SJR 20-C was undertaken by six of the seven justices of the
supreme court, 54 the governor, the attorney general of Florida, and the
organized bar. Endorsements for the proposal were sought and received from
the conferences of district court, circuit court, and county court judges, the
League of Women Voters, the prosecuting attorneys' association, the sheriffs'
association, and numerous newspaper and television editorial boards. 55
Proponents such as The Florida Bar 6 and the justices 57 argued two dominant themes of persuasion. First, the amendment would eliminate delay in the
supreme court, both by removing from the court's docket those district court
decisions without written opinion, and by eliminating all direct appeals to the
supreme court from trial courts (except in bond validation cases and cases in
which a death penalty had been imposed). Second, the amendment would
reduce the cost of litigation by reducing the number of successive appeals and
by making the district courts truly final in the bulk of matters brought to
Florida's appellate courts. Yet, as was continually pointed out, the amendment
would still provide the opportunity for supreme court review of all cases having
statewide importance.
Opposition to the amendment developed from a small group of Florida
attorneys organized by Tobias Simon as "Floridians against Limited Access,"
from one current and one former member of the supreme court,5 8 and from the
public defenders' association. The opponents' main efforts were directed toward
development of media appearances and editorial support against the amendment and to develop opposition in local bar associations.
53. Journal of the House of Representatives, 6th Legis., Spec. C Sess., Nov. 28, 1979 at

23-24; app. B.
54. Chief Justice Arthur England, and Justices Joseph Boyd, Ben Overton, Alan Sundberg,
James Alderman and Parker Lee McDonald.
55. See note 63 infra.
56. The Florida Bar and the Young Lawyers Section of The Florida Bar developed and
disseminated promotional literature, and provided speakers for both civic clubs and media
discussions and debates. Promotional literature, including targeted explanations of the
amendment, was distributed widely throughout the state to employees of the state's electric
and telephone companies, and to condominium association members.

57. Articles supporting passage of the amendment, most authored by justices of the court
supporting the amendment, were published in trade publications such as the journals or
monthly newsletters of the Florida Bankers Association, the cattlemen's association, the
county commissioners' association, the League of Municipalities, and the like. Television

appearances and radio spots were scheduled whenever possible for the justices supporting the
amendment, and for others offering public support for its adoption.
58.

Justice James Adkins and retired justice B. K. Roberts, who wm then chairman

of the

Judicial Council.
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Five dominant themes were espoused. First, it was suggested to the media
that the amendment would limit or cut off entirely their access to the supreme
court for the resolution of first amendment cases. 9 Second, local bar associations and the public were told that general access to the court would be curtailed. 60 Third, it was suggested that district court judges would be given the
power to prevent review of their decisions by the supreme court. 61 Fourth, it
was urged that the Supreme Court of Florida should be like the United States
Supreme Court and the ABA's model high tribunal, having constitutionally unlimited discretionary review of district court decisions. 2 Lastly, the opponents
inferred that the amendment was unnecessary because the court's caseload was
in fact diminishing and the justices travelled too much.
Immediately before the March 11 vote, the 1980 amendment was endorsed
editorially by almost every major daily newspaper in the state.62 The official
vote for passage on March 11 was 940,420 to 460,266 - a 67 percent ratio of
voter approval. 64 The significance of the public discussion concerning the
amendment is that it provides a frame of reference by which to ascertain the
intent of the voters. 65 In this case, the public debate and informational literature make abundantly clear that the voters were asked to approve an appellate
court structure having these features:
1. a supreme court having constitutionally limited, as opposed to unlimited,66 discretionary review of intermediate appellate court decisions;67
59. See explanation by attorney Tobias Simon, available in the Supreme Court Library.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. For example, editorial endorsements for the amendment were written by the Sarasota
Herald Tribune, Feb. 22, 1980, at 6A, col. 1;St. Petersburg Times, Feb. 29, 1980, at 20A, col.
1; Pensacola News-Journal, March 2, 1980, at 20A, col. 1; (Orlando) Sentinel Star, March 2,
1980, at 8D, col. 1; Fort Myers News-Press, March 3,1980, at 6A, col. 1; (Jacksonville) Florida
Times-Union, March 7, 1980, at A8, col. 1; Tampa Tribune, March 8, 1980, at 12A, col. 1;
(Cocoa) Today, March 9, 1980, at 22A, col. 1; Miami Herald, March 9, 1980, at 2M, col. 1; and
the Tallahassee Democrat, March 10, 1980, at 4A, col. 1. Editorials against the amendment
were written by the Ft. Lauderdale News and Sun-Sentinel, March 8, 1980, at 26A, col. 1; and
by the (Lakeland) Ledger, March 7, 1980, at 14A, col. 1.
64. Certificate of Secretary of State (unofficial).
65. Myers v. Hawkins, 362 So. 2d 926 (Fla. 1978).
66. Proponents of the amendment urged that unlimited discretionary review would
necessitate the creation of a pool of research assistants (a "hidden judicial bureaucracy") to
screen the 5,000 to 6,000 cases which would likely come to the court. Opponents did not deny
that a research pool would in all probability be required. The supporting justices expressed
concern in terms of their unwillingness to abdicate judicial decision-making to a pool of
recent law graduates. Proposed Amendment to Section 3, Article V of the State Constitution:
Tapes of Hearings on H.J. Res. 33-C Before the House Judiciary Committee, 6th Legis., Spec.
C Sess., Nov. 26, 1979, [hereinafter cited as House Committee Hearings on H.J. Res. 33-C]
(remarks of Justice Sundberg). For a recent comment on this problem, see Abramson, Should
a Clerk Ever Reveal Confidential Information?, 63 Jun. 361, 363 (1980); S. WASBY, T. MARVE.L
& A. AIRMAN, VOLUME AND DELAY IN STATE APPELLATE CouRTs: PROBLEMS AND RESPONSES, Nat]
Center for State Courts (Pub. No. R0048, 1979).
67. Adoption of the 1980 amendment was, of course, merely a reaffirmation of the decision to provide a structured review originally made in 1956 when the first district courts
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2. finality of decisions in the district courts of appeal, with further review
by the supreme court to be accepted, within the confines of its structural review,
based on the statewide importance of legal issues and the relative availability-of
the court's time to resolve cases promptly; and
3. use of the district courts for the initial appellate review of all trial court
orders and judgments, other than in death penalty and bond validation matters,

in order to cull routine points of appeal (such as evidentiary rulings) from the
important legal issues eventually brought to the court.6
V. ANALYSIS OF THE 1980 CONSTTUTONAL CHANGE

A. MandatoryJurisdiction
The mandatory jurisdiction of the supreme court is now limited to death
penalty cases from circuit courts, district court decisions invalidating state
statutes or provisions of the state constitution and, because provided by statute,
bond validations and Public Service Commission cases relating to electric, gas
and telephone utilities.
(1) Death penalties - section 3(b)(1)
The 1980 amendment provides that the supreme court
[sihall hear appeals from final judgments of trial
courts imposing the death penalty ....69
This portion of section (b)(I) isidentical to its predecessor. This aspect of

the court's jurisdiction provoked very little controversy during the discussions
leading to the 1980 amendment. 70 Indeed, it was thought that any attempt to
relieve the supreme court of its responsibilities in death penalty cases might
jeopardize the constitutionality of Florida's capital sentencing procedures.were created. House Committee Hearings on H.J. Res. 33-C, Nov. 26, 1979, supra note 66
(remarks of Benjamin Redding and Justice Sundberg).
68. Proponents of the amendment described as "baggage" the routine points of appeal
formerly brought along with the issue or issues which provided jurisdictional authority for
filing in the supreme court. Senate Committee Hearings on S.J. Res. 20-C, Nov. 26, 1979, supra
note 47 (remarks of Justice Sundberg); House Committee Hearings on H.j. Res. 33-C, Nov.
26, 1979, supra note 66 (remarks of Benjamin Redding).
69. FLA.CoNsr. art. V,§ 3(b)(1).
70. During the deliberations of the Appellate Structure Commission, a suggestion was
made that review of death penalty cases be bifurcated, so that only sentences would first be
reviewed by the supreme court. It was thought that a reduction of a death sentence to life
would obviate the need for a full record review of the conviction in the supreme court. In
view of the necessity of an initial full record review to determine the appropriateness of the
sentence, however, a subsequent district court review of the conviction was rejected as being
duplicative and unwieldy. See Appellate Structure Commission minutes, Feb. 22, 1979, supra
note 31 (statement of Tobias Simon); Letter from Tobias Simon to Justice Overton (Feb. 14,
1979).
71. The constitutionality of these procedures, which are codified in § 921.141, Florida
Statutes (1979), was upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Proffitt v. Florida, 428
U.S. 242 (1976). In that case, the Court recognized the vital role of the Supreme Court of
Florida in reviewing "each death sentence to ensure that similar results are reached in

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1980

15

Florida Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 2 [1980], Art. 1
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXII

In recent years, the review of death penalty cases has consumed an estimated
25 percent of the court's available work time. 72 The time-consuming nature of
this review stems in part from the exceptionally high number of death penalty
cases before the court. The court has received an average of 30 to 35 cases in
this category each year since the enabling statute was enacted 7 3 and at the time
of the adoption of the 1980 amendment approximately 110 such cases were
pending in the court.7 4 The difficulty of the task also constitutes an immense
drain on judicial time because the supreme court must review the entire record
to determine both the validity of the conviction and the appropriateness of the
sentence of death.7 5 This system of dual review mandated by statute 6 is probably essential to the constitutional imposition of any death penalty. 77 Since the
1980 amendment neither disturbs prior procedures nor affects current trends,
it is certain that review of death penalty cases will continue to constitute a
major part of the court's work.
(2) Life sentences - section 3(b)(2)
The 1980 amendment provides that the supreme court
[w]hen provided by general
from ... orde~ s--f---ai-e
78
.
pesenmen

law , shall hear

-s--esi

g-

appeals
e-m-

Under current Florida law, conviction for a capital felony T9 may give rise to
either a sentence of life imprisonment or a sentence of death. 0 The supreme
court has direct appellate jurisdiction of death penalty cases under section
3(b)(1). 81 In contrast, life imprisonment cases traditionally have been reviewed

similar cases," and concluded that the state tribunal performed this function "with a maximum of rationality and consistency." Id. at 258-59 (footnote omitted).
72. Senate Committee Hearings on S.J. Res. 20-C, Nov. 26, 1979, supra note 47 (remarks
of Judge Albert Tate, United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit); see also House Committee Hearings on H.J. Res. 33-C, Nov. 26, 1979, supra note 66 (remarks of Chief Justice
England).
78. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(4) (1979). Statistics obtained from the Clerk of the Supreme
Court of Florida.
74. Id.
75. See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); LeDuc v. State, 365 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 1978);
Gibson v. State, 351 So. 2d 948 (Fla. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1004 (1978); State v. Dixon,
283 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943 (1974). The court always examines both
the conviction and the sentence, even though the defendant does not challenge his conviction.
351 So. 2d at 949 & n.2. See note 70 supra.
76. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(4) (1979); FLA. R. App. P. 9.140(f).
77. See note 71 and accompanying text, supra.
78. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(2).
79. There are only two capital felonies in Florida - first-degree murder, FLA. STAT.
§ 782.04(1) (1979), and sexual battery (when committed by an adult upon a minor 11 years
of age or younger), FLA. STAT. § 794.011(2) (1979).
80. FLA. STAT. § 775.082(1) (1979).
81. See note 69 and accompanying text, supra.
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initially by the district courts of appeal. 82 Under former section 3(b)(2), the
legislature had the power to assign these cases to the supreme court, but it never
chose to do so.
On recommendation of the supreme court, the 1980 amendment was
fashioned to eliminate the legislature's authority to assign the review of life
sentences to the supreme court. The purpose for the deletion was twofold.
There was little likelihood the legislature would ever assign life imprisonment
cases to the supreme court, as there was no expressed dissatisfaction with decisions in those cases emanating from the district courts of appeal. 8 More important, there was no certainty as to the actual number of life imprisonment
cases which legislative assignment would send to the court. 84 Two justices expressed serious concern that any such assignment would overwhelm the court
with capital cases. 85
The deletion of the legislature's authority to assign life imprisonment cases
to the supreme court will have no effect on existing practice or the validity of
the statute which authorizes imposition of a death penalty.88 Cases involving a
life sentence will continue to be reviewed by the district courts of appeal.

82. See, e.g., Trotter v. State, 377 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1979); Bradley v. State, 374
So. 2d 1154 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1979); Cason v. State, 373 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1979).
83. It should be noted that several judicial and legislative attacks on the limited nature
of the supreme court's jurisdiction have been unsuccessful. For example, Justice Ervin argued
in dissent in State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 18 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943 (1974), that
the court's inability to review life imprisonment cases prevented it from properly monitoring
uneven sentencing in capital cases. Id. Similar fears were later expressed by Justice England.
Alvord v. State, 322 So. 2d 533, 541-42 (Fla. 1975) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 428 U.S.
923 (1976). Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court firmly rejected this argument in
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), concluding "[t]his problem is not sufficient to raise a
serious risk that the state capital-sentencing system will result in arbitrary and capricious
imposition of the death penalty." 428 U.S. at 259 n.16.
The Court's conclusion in Proffitt did not end debate over the wisdom of mandating state
supreme court review of life imprisonment cases. During the debates of the 1977 Florida
Constitution Revision Commission, several commissioners renewed the argument that such review was necessary to ensure uniformity in the imposition of the death penalty. See Transcript
of Fla. Const. Rev. Comm'n proceedings 214-27 (Jan. 26, 1978), 41-52 (Jan. 27, 1978). As a
result of these debates, the Commission included in its package of revisions a proposal giving
a defendant the option of appealing his conviction to the supreme court when a life sentence
was imposed. This proposal, like all others in the Commission's package, was defeated by the
voters at the November, 1978 general election. For a complete analysis of the background and
possible effect of this proposal on the workload of the supreme court, see Note, A Step
Toward Uniformity: Review of Life Sentences in Capital Cases, 6 FIA. ST. U.L. Rav. 1015
(1978).
84. It is interesting to note that during the debates of the 1977 Florida Constitution Revision Commission, then Chief Justice Overton predicted that the Commission's proposal giving defendants the option of appealing life imprisonment cases to the supreme court, see
note 83 supra- would add at least 150-200 merit appeals to the court's workload each year.
Transcript of Fla. Const. Rev. Comm'n proceedings 247-48 (Mar. 7, 1978).
85. Senate Committee Hearings on S.f. Res. 714, May 3, 1979, note supra 39 (remarks of

Justice Sundberg); Address by Chief Justice Arthur J. England, Jr. to the Commission on the
Florida Appellate Court Structure (Aug. 28, 1978).
86. FiA. StAr. § 921.141 (1979).
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(3) Appeals from trial courts - formerly section 3(b)(1)
The 1980 amendment provides that the supreme court
[sihall hear appeals

... In-it-ai~ly

i

... fr-em - -4e-r-s- -Ef--

_ly-paai-ig-,-,--the- re-l

C -ae - -tatt-- -ep -a
-~~a
-s-t-t+it-e- -er - t~et---err
- ederr~± -Coni-ef--he - -ttierr~-i<--aUnder former section 3(b)(1), orders of circuit courts and county courts
could be brought to the supreme court by direct appeal if they initially and
directly passed on the validity of a state statute, a federal statute, or a federal
treaty (either expressly or inherently), or if they expressly ss construed a provision of the state or federal constitution. By far, the most important feature
of the 1980 amendment is the abolition of all direct appeals to the supreme
court from trial courts in these five generic categories.
Jurisdiction to review declarations of statutory and state constitutional invalidity under section 3(b)(1) is now expressly limited to "decisions of district
courts of appeal .... 8I'9 The court's discretionary authority to review declarations of statutory validity and constitutional constructions under section 3(b)(3)
is also limited to district court decisions. As a corollary of these changes, of
course, the "initially and directly" requirement 90 became unnecessary and was
deleted. The intended result of these related changes is that appeals from
challenges to a state statute or to a constitutional provision will now be considered in the district courts of appeal, with presumptive finality of the appeals
process in those courts as to all cases other than those in which a declaration of
invalidity results. 9 '
Reasons for the reassignment of jurisdiction were numerous. First, cases
coming to the supreme court from the trial courts usually lacked a written explanation of the reasoning for the decision where a statute was declared valid.
Moreover, many were at a preliminary stage of the trial proceeding. As a consequence of these factors, neither the reasoning of the trial judge nor a developed record was available for review of the constitutional question pre87. FLA. CoNsr. art. V, § 3(b)(1).
88. Although former § 3(b)(1), by its terms, did not require that constitutional constructions be "express," this requirement had been imposed on the provision by the case law. See
Rojas v. State, 288 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 1973); Ogle v. Pepin, 273 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 1973) (holding
the inherency doctrine inapplicable to constitutional constructions).
89. FLA. CONsr. art. V, § 3(b)(1). See note 98 and accompanying text, infra.
90. This requirement limited supreme court review in any particular case to the order
or decision of the court which first passed on the validity of a statute or which first construed
a constitutional provision. See Matthews v. State, 363 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 1978); In re Kionka's
Estate, 121 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 1960) (O'Connell, J., concurring specially).
91. The circuit court, rather than the district court, will hear appeals from county court
orders. FLA. STAT. § 26.012(1) (1979). Conceivably, supreme court review of some county court
orders invalidating a statute or constitutional provision could be precluded, depending on the
action of reviewing tribunals. For an explanation and analysis of this problem, see notes 110119 and accompanying text, infra.
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sented. 92 The court thus faced abstract constitutional questions presenting the
most difficult form of legal issue for it to review because the parties frequently
viewed the issue in different perspectives. As a result of the absence of a factual
context, the precedential value of the court's decisions in these areas was often,
93
although inadvertently, either overnarrow or overbroad.
Equally affecting the workload of the court was the fact that trial court decisions frequently carried a number of rulings on subsidiary issues, bringing
before the supreme court a range of comparatively insignificant matters which
did not warrant review by the state's highest tribunal. Nonetheless, the jurisprudence had developed that the supreme court would consider the entire case
once any appealable issue had arisen. 9' The consequence of this doctrine was

that subsidiary, nonconstitutional issues were brought to the court which could
have been equally well handled by three district court judges.
In recent years the court criticized the apparent use of this constitutional
provision as a means either of bypassing the district courts of appeal or coming
to the supreme court for review of evidentiary and other "routine" matters on
the basis of a technical or occasionally "frivolous" constitutional issue. 9 The
most flagrant abuse of this jurisdictional tool was the practice of raising a constitutional issue by simple motion, perhaps as one ground of many, before a
county or circuit court, with no intention to develop or argue the constitutional
claim.9 8
After considering these problems, both the Appellate Structure Commission
and the bar committee concluded that, with the obvious exception of death
penalty and bond validation cases, all matters coming to the supreme court
from trial courts should pass through the district courts of appeal. Generally,
it was thought a more refined record and distillation of the issues would result
92. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 351 So. 2d 10, 13 (Fla. 1977) (England, J., dissenting);
Jordan v. State, 334 So. 2d 589, 593 (Fla. 1976) (England, J., dissenting).
93. See, e.g., Spears v. State, 337 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 1976), limited in State v. Keaton, 371
So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1979).
94. See Coffin v. State, 374 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 1979); Anoll v. Pomerance, 363 So. 2d 329
(Fla. 1978); Griffis v. State, 356 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 1978); Allen v. State, 326 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 1975).
The rationale traditionally offered in support of this doctrine is that it promotes "the efficient
and speedy administration of justice . .

.", P.C.

Lisseden Co. v. Board of County Comm'rs,

116 So. 2d 632, 636 (Fla. 1959), for as the court noted in Coffin, "once a case has been accepted and the issues briefed and argued, transfer of the cause involves a repetitive waste of
judicial time and energy." 374 So. 2d at 508.
In extreme cases - that is, where the constitutional issue is obviously "frivolous" or insubstantial and is employed solely to provide a basis for supreme court jurisdiction - the
court will depart from this doctrine and transfer the entire case to the appropriate lower court.
See, e.g., MBF Theatres, Inc. v. State, 373 So. 2d 920 (Fla. 1979); Simmons v. State, 354 So. 2d
1211 (Fla. 1978); Evans v. Carroll, 104 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1958).
95. See Coffin v. State, 374 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 1979); Evans v. Carroll, 104 So. 2d 375 (Fla.
1958). In Coffin, the court urged appellate practitioners to challenge "frivolous" constitutional
issues by appropriate motions before argument. The court also cautioned that attempts to
expand jurisdiction by focusing on these constitutional issues might "obscure lesser, but sig1 1
nificant, trial errors." 374 So. 2d at 508 &n.6.
96. See Johnson v. State, 351 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1977); Jordan v. State, 334 So. 2d 589 (Fla.

1976).
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from this process. Additionally, the presence of a written opinion by the district
court would facilitate the supreme court's consideration of all other cases.97
No estimate was made as to the number of new trial court orders which the
1980 amendment would add to the caseload of the district courts. The bar
committee and the legislature felt, however, that the impact on each district
court would be minimal because of the diffusion of these cases among the five
appellate districts. In fact, there are no reported instances of the supreme
court's having reviewed a trial court order which initially and directly passed
on the validity of a federal statute or treaty. Therefore, this authority for review was removed by the 1980 amendment.
(4) Invalidity of state statute or constitutional provision - section 3(b)(1)
The 1980 amendment provides that the supreme court
[s]hall hear appeals from ... decisions of district
courts of appeal declaring invalid a state statute or
a provision of the state constitution ....98
This provision drastically alters the court's former mandatory jurisdiction
over questions of statutory validity and constitutional construction. Before the
1980 amendment, section 3(b)(1) required the supreme court to review both
trial court orders and district court decisions which "initially and directly"
passed on the validity of a state statute, federal statute or treaty, or which construed a provision of the state or federal constitution. 09 These five generic
categories placed a very broad range of cases within the court's mandatory
jurisdiction.
The 1980 amendment significantly narrows the scope of former section
3(b)(1). The supreme court's mandatory jurisdiction is now limited to district
court decisions, and only to those which declare invalid either a state statute or
a provision of the state constitution. 100 When a district court pronounces a
statute or constitutional provision valid, review must be sought only under the
court's discretionary authority.' 0 ' Review of constitutional constructions is also
shifted to the court's discretionary jurisdiction 02 As previously noted, supreme
court review of orders and decisions passing on the validity of federal statutes
and treaties has been completely eliminated.
The rationale for these changes is best understood by reference to the development of the provision which was eventually enacted. The Appellate Structure Commission and the bar committee considered whether it was necessary
for the supreme court to review every district court decision which declared
97. Senate Committee Hearings on S.J. Res. 714, April 12, 1979, supra note 39 (comments
of Justice Sundberg).
98. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(1).
99. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(1) (1968).
100. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(1).
101. Id. § 3(b)(3).
102. Id.
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valid a state statute or a provision of the state constitution.103 Often these decisions lack statewide significance, or do not pose significant issues for supreme
court consideration. For example, in Hotoph v. State, 04 the court was forced to
examine the constitutionality of a special law prohibiting net or seine fishing
in certain parts of St. Johns County. 05 Some cases do have statewide significance, of course, and those will come to the court for discretionary consideration with a presumption of both legislative correctness, 00 and judicial correctness. 07 These factors obviously tend to reduce the likelihood that supreme
court review will alter the result in any particular case, and therefore mandatory review was not thought to be necessary.
Any district court decision invalidating a statute or provision of the state
constitution would necessarily result in some disharmony in the law or confusion in the administration of justice throughout the state. Supreme court review is essential for uniformity in the application of the law in those cases. In
contrast, the court's refusal to review a case validating a statute or a constitutional provision will have no adverse effect on the statewide operation of the
law or constitution.
These considerations prompted the commission and the bar committee to
recommend that the supreme court consider as a matter of right only those cases
in which a statute or constitutional provision is declared invalid, and leave
other cases involving questions of statutory validity or constitutional construction to its discretionary jurisdiction. 108 The Clerk of the supreme court has
estimated that approximately 25 cases of constitutional or statutory invalidity
will come to the court each year after the adoption of the 1980 amendment. 09
Although new section 8(b)(1) is precisely worded, the provision has been so
completely changed that a few unanswered questions necessarily remain.

(a) County court orders
One question is whether the limitation of the court's mandatory jurisdiction
to "decisions of district courts of appeal""' O prevents supreme court review of
cases emanating from county court orders which invalidate statutes or constitutional provisions. Under the present statutory scheme, the circuit courts have
103. Appellate Structure Commission minutes, Oct. 12, 1978, supra note 31. See also app. E.
104. 867 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. 1979).
105. Similarly, in Graham v. State, 362 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 1978), the court upheld the constitutionality of a statute making it unlawful for any person to molest crab traps, lines, or
buoys without the permission of the owner.
106. Statutes are presumptively constitutional, and all reasonable doubts are resolved in
favor of their validity. A.B.A. Indus., Inc. v. City of Pinellas Park, 566 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 1979);
Belk-James, Inc. v. Nuzum, 358 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 1978); Golden v. McCarty, 337 So. 2d 388
(Fla. 1976).
107. A trial court's findings and judgment come to an appellate court clothed with a
presumption of correctness. Delgado v. Strong, 360 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1978); Herzog v. Herzog,
346 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 1977). Similar deference would obtain for district court decisions coming
to the supreme court.
108. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3). See notes 204-227 and accompanying text, infra.
109. Statistics obtained from the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Florida.
110. FLA. CONsr. art. V, § 3(b)(1).
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general appellate jurisdiction over the county courts,' and any further appellate review of a county court order generally lies within the district court's
discretionary certiorari jurisdiction.112 It is conceivable that a county court
order invalidating a state statute or constitutional provision might never be
received by the supreme court if, on review, the circuit court affirmed the
order and a district court later denied certiorari review. Conceivably, then, a
statute or constitutional provision could be valid in some counties or circuits
of the state and invalid in others. This obviously would undermine the framers'
intent to ensure uniformity in the law.31"
Although this problem was not anticipated by the framers, there are at
least two possible solutions. First, district courts could be encouraged to grant
certiorari review in all cases where a circuit court order, on review of a county
court order, has invalidated a statute or a constitutional provision." 4 District
court review would then give at least three appellate judges"15 the opportunity
to examine the case on the merits. More significantly, it would lay the predicate
for a future review in the supreme court.
As a second possible solution, the legislature could enact a statutory "bypass" for the circuit courts, giving the district courts direct appellate jurisdiction over all county court orders passing on the validity of a state statute or
constitutional provision.1l6 This procedure would expedite district court review
and ensure that the supreme court has the final word on all invalidation cases.
It would also prevent four levels of review, and attendant delay, for this class
of cases. At the start of the 1980 legislature's regular session, the supreme court
requested that the legislature adopt this second alternative."1
111. FLA. STAT. § 26.012(1) (1979).
112. FLA. CONST. art. V,§ 4(b)(3).
113. See note 108 and accompanying text, supra.
114. This problem was discussed at a meeting of the state's appellate judges and justices,
which was convened by the chief justice on March 22, 1980. Of the 33 district court judges
present, all agreed that review should be granted in all such cases even though certiorari was

the basis of the request.
115. More than three judges will have the opportunity to review the case if the district
court decides to sit en banc. See FLA. R. APP. P. 9.331 (1977).
116. Both the circuit courts and the district courts benefited from a similar sort of "constitutional double bypass" under old § 3(b)(1) since all county court orders involving constitutional constructions or questions of statutory validity were appealable directly to the
supreme court. See FLA. STAT. § 26.012(1) (1979).
117. At the request of the supreme court, bills were introduced at the 1980 regular session
of the legislature to revise § 26.012(1), Florida Statutes (1979), as follows:

26.012

Jurisdiction of circuit court.-

(l) Circuit courts shall have jurisdiction of
_hese--appeas
appeals from county courts except
wieih -may-be-takeR-aireety -te-the -Spreme-GeC
appeals of county court orders and judgments declaring
invalid a state statute or a provision of the state
constitution.
Fla. S.702 (Reg. Sess. 1980); Fla. P.C.B. 38 (Reg. Sess. 1980). In effect, this proposal would
enable a bypass of the circuit courts whenever a county court order declared invalid a state
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It should be. noted that section 3(b)(5) enables a district court to certify a
trial court order directly to the supreme court if it requires immediate resolution and is either of great public importance or will have a great effect on the
administration of justice. 1 8 Some county court invalidations, whether initially
brought to a district court or brought through a circuit court affirmance, could
fall within this provision if its requirements were met.- 9

(b) Inherency doctrine
A second question is whether the new provision, which mandates review of
district court decisions "declaring invalid" either a state statute or constitutional provision, carries forward the inherency doctrine of Harrell's Candy
Kitchen. 2 0 Under this doctrine, it was not necessary that a written opinion or
order expressly rule on the validity of a state statute' 2' in order to predicate
review in the supreme court. A ruling of validity that was implied or inherent
122
in the lower court's decision was considered sufficient.
If the new provision were interpreted to obviate the old inherency doctrine
and require an express declaration of invalidity, the possibility would exist that
some district court decisions "declaring invalid" a state statute or constitutional
provision would not be eligible for supreme court review. For example, a trial
court could declare a state statute invalid and a district court could affirm the
trial court without an explanation of its action.123 Thus, the decision might not

be reviewable in the supreme court.'124 Such a result would clearly be at odds
with the intent of the framers in adopting the provision.125 Moreover, the
contrast between the "expressly" requirements in section 3(b)(3) and the omission of any like directive in this section suggests that inherency is preserved.
Thus, the term "declaring invalid" should carry forward the inherency doctrine
to the extent that the district court's action can be shown to be predicated on a
trial court order which declares a statute or constitutional provision invalid.
statute or constitutional provision. If enacted, the district courts would be required to de-

termine whether this provision applies to "as applied" invalidations as well as facial invalidations. This had been an issue for the supreme court before the 1980 amendment. See
notes 126-182 and accompanying text, infra. The district courts could treat the issue differently,
perhaps leading to a direct conflict of decisions which the supreme court would want to
resolve.
118. FLA. CoNSr. art, V. § 3(b)(5).

119. See, e.g., State v. Champe, 373 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1978), discussed at notes 271-272 and
accompanying text, infra.
120. See Harrell's Candy Kitchen, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Auth., III So. 2d
439 (Fla. 1959), discussed at notes 12-13 and accompanying text, supra.
121. Under the case law which had developed prior to the 1980 amendment, application
of the inherency doctrine was limited to cases involving questions of statutory validity; it did
not apply to those cases construing a provision of the state or federal constitution. See, e.g.,
Craft v. Craft, 276 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1973); Ogle v. Pepin, 273 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 1973).
122. See, e.g., Gissendanner v. State, 373 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 1979); Levitz v. State, 339 So. 2d

655 (Fla. 1976).
123. The district court's decision without an explanation could be a per curiam affirmance

or a written opinion which says simply that all points have been considered and are without
merit.
124. See notes 171-192 and accompanying text, infra.
125. See notes 103-108 and accompanying text, supra.
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The inherency problem should rarely arise. District court judges, it would
seem, have an obligation to express their reasoning for so solemn a responsibility as declaring invalid either a state statute or a provision of the state constitution. A district court might well reduce its writing role, however, by
adopting a trial court's order which adequately articulates reasoning for the
action taken and reproducing that order as its opinion. In those cases, no problem of inherency will arise because the district court's decision will be adequately expressed for subsequent review.
(c) "As applied" decisions
A third question under new section 3(b)(1) arises from the distinction between an attack on the validity of a statute "on its face" as opposed to "as
applied." A facial attack on the validity of a statute challenges its constitutionality for all situations.126 In contrast, an as applied attack merely challenges
the statute's constitutionality as it pertains to the facts of a particular case. 1 27 It
is thus possible for a statute to be constitutionally valid on its face, but invalid
1 28
as applied to a certain fact pattern.
In Snedeker v. Vernmar, Ltd.,'29 a narrowly-divided court 2 0 held that
jurisdiction would lie under old section 3(b)(1) when a lower court passed on
the validity of a statute as applied. 131 Since Snedeker, the court has regularly
entertained both facial and as applied challenges to the validity of statutes, although one justice recently questioned the wisdom of that decision.32 It remains to be seen whether the new section 3(b)(1) will carry forward Snedeker
and its progeny, so as to encompass declarations of both facial and as applied
invalidity.' 8

126. See, e.g., Vernold v. State, 376 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. 1979); Scott v. State, 369 So. 2d
330 (Fla. 1979); State v. Belgrave, 364 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 1978).
127. See, e.g., Cross v. State, 374 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 1979); Matthews v. State, 363 So. 2d
1066 (Fla. 1978); Reams v. State, 279 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 1973).
128. See, e.g., Fiske v. State, 866 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 1978); In re Fuller, 255 So. 2d I (Fla.
1971).
129. 151 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 1963).
130. The vote in Snedeker was four-to-three.
131. Snedeker overruled the court's contrary decision on this point in Stein v. Darby, 134
So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1961).
132. In Cross v. State, 374 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 1979), Chief Justice England urged that
Snedeker be reevaluated. The majority in Cross accepted jurisdiction without comment, and
then proceeded to uphold the validity of Florida's disorderly intoxication statute against a
claim that, as applied to the defendant, it impinged on protected first amendment rights. In
response, Chief Justice England stated:
After reading the majority's opinion, I cannot help asking myself why this case should
be in our Court to resolve. The majority, I believe, has merely performed an exercise of
the most fundamental form of evidential review, of the type properly performable by the
district courts of appeal rather than this tribunal.
Having asked myself why, under Florida's present appellate structure, we have provided this form of appellate review without articulating any legal principle of value to
the jurisprudence of this state, I found the answer in the Court's decision in Snedeker v.
Vernmar, Ltd., 151 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 1963), upon which the majority has implicitly relied
as the basis for our jurisdiction.
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There was virtually no discussion of this problem during the development
of the 1980 amendment. Arguably, one interpretation of section 3(b)(1) which
is consistent with the amendment's objectives, 34 is that it would not require as
applied determinations of the district courts to fall within the supreme court's
mandatory review jurisdiction. This argument is premised on the notion that
a successful as applied attack results only in a declaration that an individual
application of a statute is without the bounds of constitutional permissibility.
The challenged statute remains unaffected, posing none of the implications for
further review which led to this aspect of the court's mandatory jurisdiction.
Consequently, it can be argued that district court determinations of as applied
invalidity usually will not have statewide significance, and therefore supreme
court review is not essential. 35
Conversely, a failure to accept as applied invalidations would create a crack
through which some important cases might fall, resulting in a lack of jurisdiction for necessary supreme court review. The point can be illustrated by the
recent supreme court decision of Shevin v. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid &
Associates, Inc.3 6 In that case the court reviewed a district court decision which
had determined that a certain agent hired by a public body was subject to the
public records law. 37 Hypothetically, the district court could have ruled that
the public records law was invalid as applied to that particular agent of a
public body. If as applied determinations were not appealable under section
3(b)(1), there would be no basis for the parties to seek supreme court review
under the court's mandatory jurisdiction. Of course, the district court could
certify the issue for discretionary consideration,138 but it might not. This
scenario raises the question upon which the authors decline to speculate,
whether that case or any other which seemingly presents important public
principles needs supreme court review after the district court has fully considered the issue and ruled on the merits. 3 9 The ultimate issue in this debate

Rather than restate the jurisdictional arguments set forth in the majority and dissenting opinions in Snedeker to indicate my concerns, I need only say here that the dissenting opinion of Justice Thomas in Snedeker is by far more compelling to me than the
majority's opinion, that we should reevaluate Snedeker in light of what we now know
about the appellate processes that have evolved in the past fifteen years, and that a
realistic appraisal of contemporaneous jurisprudence in Florida will reveal that Justice
Thomas' hypothesized concerns with our taking "as applied" statutory challenges were

amazingly farsighted.
Id. at 521.

133. This analysis is equally applicable but less important under the court's authority in
section 3(b)(3) to review any decision of a district court which declares a state statute valid.
Under that provision, the court's jurisdiction is discretionary.
134. See notes 66-68 and accompanying text, supra.
135. There are other possible avenues within the court's discretionary jurisdiction for
review of district court decisions holding a statute invalid as applied. See, e.g., FLA. CONsr.

art. V, §§ 3(b)(3) (constitutional construction), 3(b)(4) (certification).
136. 579 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1980).
137. FrL. StA. ch.119 (1975).
138. FLA. CONsr. art. V, § 3(b)(4).
139. Notably, the district courts also will have to resolve the question of whether to re-
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would be whether the 1980 amendment was framed to permit district court
finality in cases such as these, or whether the as applied invalidity problem
simply was not foreseen. The debates of the framers and the information provided the public offer no answer.
(5) Bond validations - section 3(b)(2)
The 1980 amendment provides that the supreme court
[w]hen provided by general law, shall hear appeals
from final judgments ... entered in proceedings for
of bonds or certificates of indebtedthe validation
140
ness ....
Before and after the 1980 amendment, section 3(b)(2) authorized the legislature to provide by general law for supreme court review of final judgments in
bond validation proceedings. The legislature has provided for such review in
section 75.08, Florida Statutes (1979).141 This category of jurisdiction, which
brings approximately five to ten cases to the court each year,142 remained unchanged in the constitution.
The rationale for retaining authority over bond validation cases in the
supreme court appears to have been pragmatic. It was believed that the finality
of bond judgments, for marketability purposes, would be enhanced and speeded
14 3
by decisions of the supreme court rather than a district court of appeal.
Moreover, aside from being few in number, bond finance cases in the supreme
court do not entail the elaborate record review which encumbers the court in
other matters, such as death penalty cases.1 44 The court's function in reviewing
bond validation final judgments is simply to determine whether the governmental agency issuing the bonds had the power to act and whether it exercised
that power in accordance with the law.145 Review of bond validation cases therefore does not consume an inordinate amount of the court's time.
(6) Review of administrative action- section 3(b)(2); formerly sections 3(b)(3)
and 3(b)(7)
The 1980 amendment provides that the supreme court
view as applied invalidations from the trial courts. While it is possible that the five district
courts might take different stands on this issue, the supreme court ultimately could resolve
any such conflict of decisions.
140. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(2).
141. This section provides that "[a]ny party to the action whether plaintiff, defendant,
intervenor or otherwise, dissatisfied with the final judgment, may appeal to the Supreme Court
within the time and in the manner prescribed by the Florida Appellate Rules." FLA. STAT.
§ 75.08 (1979).
142. Statistics obtained from the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Florida.
143. House Committee Hearingson Hj. Res. 33-C, Nov. 26, 1979, supra note 66 (remarks

of Benjamin Redding).
144. See note 75 and accompanying text, supra.
145. Doane v. Lee County, 376 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 1979); Speer v. Olsen, 367 So. 2d 207 (Fla.
1978).
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(2) [w]hen provided by general law, ... shall review
action of statewide agencies- relating to rates or
service of utilities providing electric, gas, or telephone service."'

Before the 1980 amendment, two provisions of article V -sections

3(b)(3)

and 3(b)(7) - directed or authorized review of administrative action which
might be assigned to the supreme court by the Florida Legislature. Over the

years, only two classes of administrative cases remained with the supreme court
-Industrial Relations Commission (IRC) decisions in workmen's compensation cases, 1 4 7 and decisions of the Public Service Commission (PSC).48_
The supreme court never expressly declared whether its review of PSC

matters was premised on section 3(b)(7), which assigned the power of direct
review of administrative action as prescribed by general law, or section 3(b)(3),
which allowed review by certiorari of commissions established by general law
having statewide jurisdiction.149 It is clear, however, that the court generally

considered cases from the PSC "by certiorari," frequently denying review with-

146. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(2).
147. See, e.g., Exxon Co. v. Alexis, 870 So. 2d 1128 (Fla. 1978); Farrell v. Amica Mut. Ins.
Co., 861 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 1978).
IRC decisions were assigned to the court by 1971 Fla. Laws ch. 71-355, § 120 (former FLA
STAT. § 440.27(1)), which provided, in relevant part, that "[o]rders of the [Industrial Relations
Commission] entered pursuant to s. 440.25 shall be subject to review only by petition for writ
of certiorari to the supreme court." On October 1, 1979, review of IRC decisions was transferred to the First District Court of Appeal. See note 154 and accompanying text, infra.
148. See, e.g., Aloha Utils., Inc. v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 376 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 1979);
Gulf Coast Motor Line, Inc. v. Hawkins, 876 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 1979).
Supreme court review of PSC decisions is directed by various statutes relating to specific
regulated industries, see authorities cited in notes 158 & 162 infra, and by one "blanket"
provision, FiA. STAT. § 350.641(1) (1979) ("All petitions to the Supreme Court to review orders
of the Florida Public Service Commission by writ of certiorari shall be filed in the Supreme
Court within the time and in the manner provided by the Florida Appellate Rules."). The
1980 amendment will necessitate the repeal or revision of many of these statutes. See note
162 infra. Bills for this purpose were introduced at the commencement of the 1980 regular
session of the legislature.
149. Compare City of St. Petersburg v. Hawkins, 366 So. 2d 429, 430 (Fla. 1978) ("This
cause is before us on a petition for writ of certiorari to review an order of the Florida Public
Service Commission.... We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(7), Florida
Constitution.') with H. Miller & Sons, Inc. v. Hawkins, 378 So. 2d 913, 918 (Fla. 1979) ("This
cause is before us on petition for writ of certiorari to the Public Service Commission. Art. V,
§ (b)(3), Fla. Const.").
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out a written opinion.15o In contrast, the court specifically stated in Scholastic
Systems, Inc. v. LeLoup, 51 that its review of IRC decisions was by certiorari
under section 3(b)(3).
During the debates of the Appellate Structure Commission -s and in the
statement of principles developed by the bar committee, 153 it was generally
agreed that all administrative decisions could be properly reviewed by the
district courts of appeal instead of the supreme court. In the meantime, the
1979 legislature withdrew workmen's compensation cases from supreme court
review by its dual action of abolishing the Industrial Relations Commission
and assigning the review of workers' compensation decisions to the First District
Court of Appeal. 5 4 With that action, the supreme court's administrative review
jurisdiction was limited to matters arising from the Public Service Commission.
Considerable debate ensued as to whether even that jurisdiction of the court
should be retained. 55 However, it was decided that the statewide significance of
PSC decisions in electric, telephone and gas cases, and their financial impact on
the citizens of the State of Florida, warranted leaving the review of those Commission decisions with the court.15 6
Section 3(b)(2) commences with the phrase "when provided by general
law,"'

57

thus enabling the legislature to withdraw the court's limited jurisdic-

tion. This continues former section 3(b)(7), which indicated that reviewable
administrative actions would be those "prescribed by general law." Of course,
implementing legislation to confer jurisdiction on the supreme court already
appears in the statutes which govern the three classes of regulated utilities. 158
150. See, e.g., Flamingo Transp., Inc. v. Hawkins, 368 So. 2d 1366 (Fla. 1979); Florida
Power Corp. v. Hawkins, 366 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 1978).
151. 307 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 1974).
152. Appellate Structure Commission minutes, Oct. 12, 1978, supra note 31. See app. E.
153. See app. D.
154. See 1979 Fla. Laws, ch. 79-312, § 1. For a complete analysis of the 1979 reform of
Florida's Workers' Compensation Law, see Sadowski, Herzog, Butler & Gokel, The 1979 Florida
Workers' Compensation Reform: Back to Basics, 7 FLA. ST. U. L. REv.641 (1979).
155. See Senate Committee Hearingson S.J. Res. 20-C, Nov. 26, 1979, supra note 47; House
Committee Hearings on H. J. Res. 33-C (later replaced by S.J. Res. 20-C), Nov. 26, 1979, supra
note 66.
156. See notes 162-166 and accompanying text, infra.
157. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(2).
158. FLA. STAT. § 366.10 (1979) enables the supreme court to review PSC orders affecting gas
and electric utilities. There is no comparable provision in chapter 364, which governs the
regulation of telephone companies, so supreme court review of PSC orders affecting telephone
companies is based on FLA. STAT. § 350.641(1) (1979), the "blanket" provision. See, e.g., Florida
Tel. Corp. v. Mayo, 350 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 1977).
In response to the passage of the 1980 amendment, a bill was introduced at the 1980 regular
session of the legislature which would amend both of the above statutes to conform with the
language of new section 3(b)(2). S.B. 458 (Reg. Sess. 1980). Section 366.10, under the bill,
would provide specifically for supreme court review of "any action of the commission relating
to rates or service of utilities providing electric or gas service." Section 350.641(1), the
"blanket" provision, would be amended similarly so as to enable supreme court review of
PSC orders involving telephone, gas, and electric utilities, and a new provision in chapter 364
would provide specifically for supreme court review of PSC orders involving telephone companies. The proposed revision of § 350.641(1) also assigns review of all other PSC action to the
First District Court of Appeal.
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This new provision has several significant features which should be noted.
First, the legislature is only free to prescribe review of the action of "statewide
agencies."' 159 This term first appeared in SJR 20-C when it reached the floor of
the Senate, and is best explained by reference to the journal of the Senate on
the day this provision was adopted. 160 The term "statewide agencies" was designed both to eliminate a direct reference to the Public Service Commission,'-'
and to ensure that decisions of local agencies, such as municipal utilities, would
not be initially reviewable in the supreme court.
Second, the only classes of utilities for which supreme court review may be
prescribed are those providing electric, gas and telephone services. Eliminated
from direct supreme court review are all decisions of the Public Service Commission, or any other statewide agency, affecting other regulated industries. 162
The framers of this provision limited supreme court review to only three classes
of utilities on the basic premise that PSC decisions with respect to any of them
would have significant, statewide, financial implications, whereas PSC decisions
involving other regulatory functions would not. For example, the supreme court
had reviewed for a number of years transportation decisions of very minor statewide impact, such as those determining the size of passenger busses between
municipalities and their outlying airports,-63 regulating sightseeing services,164
and one involving the state's only regulated bridge company. 6 5 The framers
intended to cut down substantially the number of cases that would come to
the court from the PSC, and it is estimated the court will now receive approxi66
mately five to ten such cases each year.
The plan to limit supreme court review to three major classes of utility cases
was conceived through an alliance between the supreme court and representatives of the electric, gas and telephone utilities in the state. This alliance arose
as a reaction to earlier drafts of the proposed constitutional amendment, including SJR 714, which would have eliminated all supreme court review of
Public Service Commission cases.
159. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(2).
160. See app. C.
161. An earlier draft of § 3(b)(2) expressly mentioned the Public Service Commission.
This was later considered unwise in light of the possible change in the commission's name or
function, and the inappropriateness of naming any particular administrative agency in the
Florida Constitution. See app. C.
162. Ground transportation cases (e.g., bus and trucking) and water and sewer cases are
the main categories of PSC decisions which had been, but are no longer, eligible for direct
supreme court review. Some of the statutes which authorize direct supreme court review of
cases now outside the court's jurisdiction, and which therefore should be repealed, include
FLA. STAT. § 867.131 (1979) (water and sewer cases), id. § 265.12 (private wire companies), and
id. § 323.09(1) (ground transportation cases). A bill was introduced in the 1980 regular session
of the legislature to xepeal these and other inoperative statutes. S.B. 458 (Reg. Sess. 1980).
163. See, e.g., Daytona Beach Limousine Serv., Inc. v. Yarborough, 267 So. 2d 11 (Fla.

1972).
164. See, e.g., Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. v. Mayo, 333 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1976); A-I Bus
Lines, Inc. v. Bevis, 30 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1976); American Sightseeing Tours, Inc. v. Bevis, 326
So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1976).
165. See Florida Bridge Co. v. Bevis, 363 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 1978).
166. Statistics obtained from the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Florida.
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Some members of the Public Service Commission opposed placing review
of any PSC decisions in the district courts of appeal for fear of a dispersal of
review among the five district courts. 167 The 1980 amendment did not resolve
the place for review of PSC cases removed from the supreme court. Shortly after
the amendment was adopted a bill was filed to assign review of these cases to the
First District Court of Appeal. 168
Third, the 1980 amendment allows the legislature to prescribe review of the
"action" of statewide agencies relating to the three subject classes of utilities.
The obvious intent of the framers was to parallel former section 3(b)(7) and
the terminology of the Administrative Procedure Act, which describes virtually
all things which an administrative agency can do, either by order or rule, as
"agency action."169
Fourth, the provision allows review of statewide agency (PSC) actions which
relate to "rates or service."17o This phraseology was selected with the broad intent of covering all subjects of regulation relative to electric, gas and telephone
utilities. The framers of the constitutional proposal did not envision that PSC
decisions affecting these three classes of utilities would be channeled to any
district court of appeal. For practical purposes the terms "rates" and "services"
should be viewed as all-encompassing as to these utilities.
B. DiscretionaryJurisdiction
Before analyzing the categories of cases within the court's discretionary
jurisdiction, discussion of two specific changes in terminology intended to
clarify the constitutional standards is essential.
(1) Inserting "expressly"
The 1980 amendment provides in section 3(b)(3) that the supreme court
[m]ay review y-eer4eay: any decision of a district
court of appeal that expressly declares valid a state
statute, or that expressly construes a provision of
the state or federal constitution, or that expressly
affects a class of constitutional or state officers
..
or that expressly and directly conflicts ... with
a decision of another any district court of appeal or
of the supreme court on the same question of law
171

The 1980 amendment places the term "expressly" before each distinctive
167. House Committee Hearings on HJ. Res. 33-C, Nov. 26, 1979, supra note 66 (remarks
of Benjamin Redding).
168. See note 158 supra.
169. FLA. STAT. § 120.52(2) (1979); City of Plant City v. Mayo, 337 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 1976);
City of Titusville v. Florida Pub. Employees Relations Comm'n, 330 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 1st D.CA.
1976).
170. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(2).
171. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3).
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jurisdictional base of the supreme court's discretionary jurisdiction which ap-

pears in section 3(b)(3). This change is equal in importance to the reordering
of direct appeals.1 72 The profound effect of the change is that all of the court's
discretionary jurisdiction is now predicated on written opinions of the district
courts on points of law brought for review, rather than on obscure legal issues
which were never discussed at the appellate level. 178 The impact of this change
becomes apparent when one considers the practice of the court under former
section ((3).
As was mentioned earlier, 74 the major purpose of the 1956 revision of article
V was to relieve the supreme court's overburdened docket by creating the district courts and making them courts of final appellate jurisdiction in most
cases. This purpose was severely undermined by Foley, where a bare majority
(4-3) of the justices held that the court would accept jurisdiction of cases where
conflict certiorari was based solely upon a district court per curiam affirmance
of lower court action without opinion (hereafter called "PCA").175 The rather
dubious rationale offered in support of this holding was that a district court
affirmance without opinion became an effective precedent in the trial court
being affirmed, so as to provide the potential for a "conflict" of decisions within
the circuit.176 Because there was no articulation of conflicting precedent in the
172. See notes 87-97 and accompanying text, supra.
173. Possibly, a legal issue could be discussed at length in a trial court's order but avoid
supreme court review by omission from a district court's decision. The seemingly anomalous
result becomes highly rational when it is remembered that the district court may have
resolved the case on a legal or factual ground (such as standing) which made it unnecessary
or inappropriate to reach the legal issue discussed below.
174. See note 5 and accompanying text, supra.
175. Foley overruled Lake v. Lake, 103 So, 2d 639 (Fla. 1958), which held that, with some
exceptions, district court decisions are not reviewable under conflict certiorari unless there is
direct conflict on the face of the opinion.
176. In Florida Greyhound Owners & Breeders Ass'n, Inc. v. West Flagler Assocs., 847
So. 2d 408 (Fla. 1977), Justice England severely criticized this basic rationale underlying
Foley:
In my view, the [rationale] articulated by the Foley majority is in all events manifestly unsound. It is based on the indefensible assumption that trial judges assume that
district courts issue per curiam affirmances only when they agree with the trial judge's
reasons for ruling a certain way. That assumption is not only fallacious as a matter of
simple logic, but it has, since Foley, been expressly rejected by the district courts themselves.... To my mind, there is no possible way that a district court's affrmance without
opinion can create decisional disharmony in the jurisprudence of this state sufficient to
warrant our attention. The foul assumption which underlies any review is that the district
court perpetrated an injustice which it could not explain away in an opinion. I refuse to
indulge that assumption.

-.

Even if I am wrong in my premise that an affirmance without opinion doesn't constitute a "precedent," I would still contend that the need to "harmonize" such a precedent
with other decisions is too miniscule to require our intercession. A precedent so limited
simply does not create disharmony in the general law of the state. Similar situations occur
whenever a losing litigant fails to take an erroneous trial court decision to the district
court or an erroneous district court decision to us. In those cases future litigants are affected by any propensity of the trial judge or the appellate court to follow its erroneous
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district court's decision, it was necessary to create the concept of "record
proper" - the written record of the proceedings in the trial court except the
transcript of testimony 177 - from which to determine whether the district court
affirmance created the necessary conflict." 5 Justice Thornal, in dissent, strongly
criticized the majority's holding in Foley:
[A]ll of this simply means that the District Court decisions are no
longer final under any circumstances. It appears to me that the majority
view is an open invitation to every litigant who loses in the District
Court, to come up to the Supreme Court and be granted a second appeal
- the very thing which we assured the people of this state would not
happen when the judiciary article was amended in 1956.179
Justice Thornal's warning was accurate and prophetic, as the Foley doctrine
created a number of unfortunate consequences for supreme court practice.
Increasing numbers of certiorari petitions were filed alleging decisional conflict on the basis of district court PCAs, and the court found that it was no
small task either to define or to dig into the "record proper" to find decisional
conflict. 8 0 By providing both a new and virtually boundless level of review, the
Foley doctrine exacted a high price in time and money for individual litigants
and became a means of delaying lost causes.' 8" It also commanded significant
time and energy from the supreme court's justices.'

82

"precedent," yet the system survives. That is because those cases have no lasting effect on
our general jurisprudence. For the same reason, unexplained district court decisions have
only a limited potential effect throughout the system.
Id. at 410-12 (footnote omitted) (concurring opinion).
177. Foley v. Weaver Drugs, Inc., 177 So. 2d 221, 225 (Fla. 1965).
178. The concept of "record proper," which was derived from the English common law,
created great confusion in the court's jurisdictional jurisprudence. See Note, Conflict
CertiorariJurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Florida: The "Record Proper," 5 FLA. ST.
U.L. Rav. 409 (1975) and authorities cited therein. The court's expansive, yet unpredictable,
treatment of this concept led one student commentator to state that "[t]he post-Foley cases
lead to one conclusion: where the supreme court is interested in the merits of the controversy
before it, it will examine the entire record, not merely the record proper, in determining
whether it has conflict certiorari jurisdiction." Id. at 424 (emphasis in original). See also
Gibson v. Maloney, 231 So. 2d 823, 832 (Fla.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 951 (1970) (Thornal, J.,
dissenting) ("The majority is out-Foleying Foley. Just once, it would be helpful if my
colleagues who follow the Foley majority would actually define what is meant by 'record
proper' and 'transcript of testimony.' There is no clear-cut definition in the books and I
think our cases on the subject are extremely confusing.").
179. Foley v. Weaver Drugs, Inc., 177 So. 2d at 234.
180. See, e.g., AB CTC v. Morejon, 324 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1975); Baycol, Inc. v. Downtown
Dev. Auth., 315 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1975); Gibson v. Maloney, 231 So. 2d 823 (Fla.), cert. denied,
398 U.S. 951 (1970).
181. Compare FLA. R. Avp. P. 4.5(c)(6) (1962) with FLA. R. App. P. 9.120 (1977). The 1977
appellate rules removed the automatic stay which was permitted under previous rules.
182. The supreme court attempted to deal with the burden in various ways. A "pool" of
research aides was created to screen petitions and write memoranda. When this procedure
failed to keep pace with the volume, additional research aides were hired for the individual
justices. Later, new internal procedures were devised to circulate certiorari petitions, and
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By the mid-1970s, a minority of new justices on the court began challenging
the Foley doctrine183 Their protests helped shape the 1980 amendment, and
the legislative debates indicate clearly that the purpose for including the term
"expressly" in section 3(b)(3) was to overrule Foley'8 4 and thereby eliminate
supreme court review of PGAs.1s5 A written opinion of the district court on the
point of law sought to be reviewed is now an essential predicate for supreme
court review.1 s6

Under section 3(b)(3), the court clearly will refuse to review PCAs. For
similar reasons, the court should decline to review several other types of district
court decisions. Per curiam affirmances containing only a citation of authority
("citation PCAs"), for example, stand on no better precedential footing than
pure PCAs,287 and should likewise be insufficient as a basis for supreme court

litigants were required to assume the additional burden of filing multiple briefs simultaneously.
183. See, e.g., Florida Greyhound Owners & Breeders Ass'n v. West Flagler Assocs., 247
So. 2d 408 (Fla. 1977) (England, J., concurring; Overton, C.J., concurring specially); Williams
v. State, 240 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 1976) (England, J., dissenting, joined by Overton, CJ. and
Hatchett, J.); Golden Loaf Bakery, Inc. v. Charles W. Rex Constr. Co., 334 So. 2d 585 (Fla.
1976) (England, J., concurring, joined by Overton, C.J.); AB CTC v. Morejon, 324 So. 2d
625 (Fla. 1975) (England, J., dissenting, joined by Overton, C.J.); Baycol, Inc. v. Downtown
Dev. Auth., 315 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1975) (Overton, J., dissenting).
One student commentator described the situation as follows:
In the past several years, this resistance to the review of PCA's without opinion and
to the erosion of the finality of the district courts' jurisdiction has suddenly become highly
visible. Since his election to the court, Chief Justice England has written a number of

opinions recognizing the jurisdictional principles early established by the court, pointing
out the court's deviation from these established constitutional principles and vociferously
calling for the dethronement of the Foley decision. While most of the other members of
the court have concurred in England's opinions at one time or another, in no decision has
a majority of the court concurred in any opinion explicitly calling for the overruling of

Foley.
Note, Per Curiam Affirmances Without Opinion: A Proper Basis For Conflict Jurisdiction?,7
FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 295, 805-06 (1979) (footnote omitted).
As might be expected, Foley and its progeny were subjected to intense discussion in
academic circles. Most commentators were highly critical of the decision. See generally id.;
Note, supra note 178; Note, EstablishingNew Criteria for Conflict Certiorariin Per Curiam
District Court Decisions: A First Step Toward a Definition of Power, 29 U. FLA. L. REy.
35 (1977); Note, Conflict Certiorari:Scope and Purpose Examination, 6 STrsoN INTRA. L.
REv. 15 (1976); Comment, CertiorariReview of District Court of Appeal Decisions by the
Supreme Court of Florida,28 U. MxAMI L. Rav. 952 (1974).
184. See notes 28-68 and accompanying text, supra.
185. While requests for the review of PCAs could have been grounded on jurisdictional
bases other than conflict certiorari under former § 3(b)($), conflict assertions were most prevalent.
186. FLA. CoNsr. art. V, § 3(b)(3) (1980). Of course, a written opinion does not guarantee
that the supreme court will accept jurisdiction of the matter. Section 3(b)(3) is within the
court's discretionaryjurisdiction.
187. The citation of authorities in a citation PCA is for the benefit of the parties, not the
public at large. Thus, a citation PCA is normally of no precedential value. P. CARRirroN,
D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, JusTicE ON APPEAL 3, 29-40 (1976).
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review. 88 So-called "no merit opinions," which merely state that the court has
reviewed the record and found no merit in the points presented and no reversible error in the record, should be similarly treated.8 9 Being of no real
precedential value, and failing to treat "expressly" any point of law, these
classes of opinions should form no basis for supreme court review.
Similarly, the "inherency" doctrine developed in Harrel'sCandy Kitchen"0
will no longer be applicable under section 3(b)(3). The "expressly" requirement, obviously, cannot be met by an inherent declaration of a statute's validity
in a written opinion which does not discuss the statute.
The history of the 1980 amendment indicates, however, that while a district
court written opinion must treat the area of law sought to be reviewed, it is
not essential that a conflict of decisions be recognized or acknowledged in the
opinion. Any discussion of a point of law which in fact "directly conflicts" with
another appellate precedent is grounds for a request for review. This construction of section 3(b)(3) accomodates the bar's insistence that attorneys retain
the right to argue an alleged conflict, and that they need not be required to
rely on the district courts to preserve their review right by mentioning the cases
with which the court disagrees. This position is bolstered by the amendment's

188. There is one circumstance which could argue for an exception to this rule. If a case
cited as authority in a citation PCA is overruled on the legal issue asserted for conflict within
the 30-day time period for filing for review, see Fr.A. R. ApP. P. 9.120(b), then it is arguable
that the district court's decision is in "conflict" with the overruling case so that the supreme
court should have jurisdiction. The court itself is generally aware of the recent overruling
case, and has generally accepted jurisdiction of such cases in the past to avoid an unjust result
to a litigant whose case is not truly concluded. Cf., e.g., Robbins v. State, 364 So. 2d 871 (Fla.
3d D.C.A. 1978), remanded, No. 55,857 (Fla. Mar. 27, 1980) (the supreme court accepted
jurisdiction of, and then remanded, a district court no merit opinion which cited as its sole
authority a case which had been reversed recently by the court). In these instances the court
may simply remand to the district court for reconsideration in light of the overruling decision.
This possible exception to a rule calling for the total rejection of citation PCAs by the court
is distinguishable from cases in which the time for review has expired when the precedent is
overruled, even if it is one day later. In those situations, the doctrine of finality of decisions
operates to override all other considerations.
189. The following is a typical "no merit opinion," or more precisely, a "citation no
merit opinion":
This is an appeal from a final judgment in a suit to quiet title instituted by the
Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, an agency of the State of
Florida Department of Natural Resources, in the Circuit Court for the Eleventh Judicial
Circuit of Florida. We have carefully examined the thorough and detailed final judgment
entered by the trial court in this cause together with the record on appeal and the briefs
of the parties. In our view, no reversible error has been shown. Accordingly, the final
judgment appealed from is affirmed. Shaw v. Shaw, 334 So. 2d 13, 16 (Fla. 1976); Jefferson
National Bank at Sunny Isles v. Metropolitan Dade County, 271 So. 2d 207, 214 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1972); Cars v. Woodard, 214 So. 2d 385, 386 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968).
Affirmed.
Brown v. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, 369 So. 2d 640 (Fla.
3d D.C.A. 1979).
190. See notes 12-13 and accompanying text, supra.
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creation of certified conflict, which accommodates instances of recognized con91
I
flict and allows the district courts to certify the conflict.
The addition of the term "expressly" should vastly improve supreme court
practice under section 3(b)(3). The much-maligned and confusing doctrine of
"record proper" will have been interred, saving the justices immeasurable time
and effort in locating alleged decisional conflict. The clerk's office will be able
to screen petitions to ascertain if they are supported by a written opinion of a
district court, and those without such support will simply be returned to the
filing attorney. The court's review process for exercising its discretion will be
expedited considerably by the district court's discussion of the point of law
brought for review, enabling significantly shorter jurisdictional briefs.192'Moreover, where jurisdiction is accepted, the court will have a better basis for making an informed decision since the written opinions of the appellate courts will
most likely analyze both sides of the same issue.
Section 3(b)(3) now places an increased obligation on district court judges
who again have some ability to control a party's right to supreme court review.
Now, as was originally intended, these judges must keep a wary eye on the
broad import of their decisions before issuing an affirmance without opinion.
It goes without saying that the press and the public will keep a wary eye on
them.

(2) Deleting "by certiorari"
The deletion of the words "by certiorari" from section 3(b)(8) may prove to
be another very significant aspect of the 1980 amendment. Under the, former
provision, the supreme court's discretionary jurisdiction in section 3(b)(3) was
exercised "by certiorari," based on common law notions of that term. Certiorari
is essentially a common law writ issued by a superior court to an inferior court
for the purpose of bringing up the record to determine whether the inferior
court exceeded its jurisdiction or failed to proceed according to the essential
requirements of law.19 3 Generally, certiorari is not available to review final
judgments and decrees where another remedy exists,194 and the issuance of a
writ of certiorari will always lay in the sound discretion of the superior court. 195
In DeGroot v.-Sheffield, 196 Justice Thornal emphasized the limited nature of

191. FLA. CoNsT. art. V,§ 9(b)(4).
192. Currently, jurisdictional briefs are limited to 20 pages. FLA. R. App. P. 9.210(a)(5).
193. Dade County v. Marca, S.A., 826 So. 2d 183' (Fla. 1976); Ellison v. City of Ft.
Lauderdale, 183 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1966); Kilgore v. Bird, 149 Na. 570, 6 So. 2d 541 (1942);
G-W Dev. Corp. v. Village of N. Palm Beach Zoning Bd.of Adjustment, 317- So. 2d 828 (Fa.
4th D.C.A. 1975).
194. DeGroot v. Sheffield, 95 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1957); Roper v. Roper, 336 So. 2d 654 (Fla.
4th D.C.A. 1976); G-W Dev. Corp. v. Village of N. Palm Beach Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 317
So. 2d 828 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1975); Biscayne Kennel Club, Inc. v. Board of Bus. Reg., 239 So. 2d
53 (Na. 1st D.C.A. 1970).
195. Burdine's, Inc. v. Drennon, 97 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1957); G-W Dev. Corp. v. Village of
N. Palm Beach Zoning Bd.of Adjustment, 317 So. 2d 828 (Fla.4th D.C.A. 1975); Arvida Corp.

v. City of Sarasota, 213 So. 2d 756 (Fla. 2d D.CA. 1968).
196. 95 So. 2d 912 (Na. 1957).
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certiorari review, noting that the reviewing court will not undertake to reweigh
or reevaluate the evidence presented to the lower tribunal.
The implicit incorporation of common law principles in former section
3(b)(3) led to a number of unfortunate consequences. For one, bringing up the
lower court's entire record allowed the supreme court to review the full record
and address the merits of all points in cases it had accepted for review.1 97 For
another, a notion developed over the years that finding a decisional conflict
required, rather than permitted, acceptance of the case for review. 98 This
practice led members of the Appellate Structure Commission to conclude that
the court had all but written the word "may" out of section 3(b)(3). 1 9 Moreover, the certiorari issue contributed to the court's frequent, and often lengthy
discussions regarding the acceptance or rejection of jurisdiction.200
The combined effect of these developments was to waste vast amounts of
judicial time and labor. The justices often reached issues which had already
received full consideration by a district court, and considered the non-substantive subject of jurisdiction. These practices encouraged attorneys to seek a
third, plenary review, and created a climate whereby attorneys could never
advise their clients that a case was indeed final after district court review. Full
review by certiorari, coupled with the Foley doctrine, in effect evolved into a
practice by judicial fiat, giving the court the role rejected by the framers of the
1956 constitution -that of third level, unlimited, discretionary review of the
full record of every case which passed through the district courts.
The debates which led to the 1980 constitutional reform quite clearly indicate that the term "may" has been resurrected to its original stature. 20 1 The
deletion of "by certiorari" from section 3(b)(3) was intended to eliminate the
common law jurisdictional predicate of bringing up the whole record for
scrutiny and therefore signifies the end of full record review of a discretionary
case.2 02 The supreme court should now decline to review any district court
decision which the court deems to lack importance to the jurisprudence of the
state, even though a conflict of decisions or one of the other enumerated criteria
for review exists. Opinions should embrace only the legal issue which was important enough to persuade the justices to accept the case for review. The need
for protracted written debates on the existence or nonexistence of a jurisdictional predicate will be obviated, since the supreme court's decisions will themselves deal with the legal issue or issues on which jurisdiction was predicated.203
197. Bould v. Touchette, 349 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 1977); D'Agostino v. State, 310 So. 2d 12
(Fla. 1975); Kennedy v. Kennedy, 303 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 1974).
198. Numerous cases invoking the court's conflict jurisdiction speak in terms of the
court's "duty" to consider the case on the merits. E.g., Tyus v. Apalachicola N. R. R., 130
So. 2d 580 (Fla. 1961); Adjmi v. State, 154 So. 2d 812, 817 (Fla. 1963).
199. Appellate Structure Commission Report, 53 FLA. B.J. 274, 285 (1979).
200. E.g., PERC v. School Bd. of Palm Beach County, 380 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1980) (England,
C.J., dissenting); Kendry v. Division of Admin., State Dept. of Transp., 366 So. 2d 391, 395
(Fla. 1978) (Overton, J., dissenting); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Goodman, 276 So. 2d 465
(Fla. 1972).
201. Senate Hearings on S.J. Res. 20-C, Nov. 26, 1979, supra note 47 (remarks of Chief
Justice England).
202. Id.
203. There is one minor exception to this point. The initial decisions defining the
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As for that aspect of the common law concept of certiorari which allows the
superior court to refuse review when another remedy is available, that principle
should remain intact as a matter of conscience for the seven justices. One

ramification of these changes in the court's constitutional jurisdiction is to give
the court greater control of its discretionary jurisdiction, another goal so often
mentioned in the history of the 1980 amendment.
(3) Validity of state statutes - section 3(b)(3)
The 1980 amendment provides that the supreme court
[mjay review by-eeLe-eaE4- any decision of a district
court of appeal that expressly declares valid a state
statute .... Z04
The district court's declaration of validity must be expressed in a written
opinion of a district court dealing in some form with the legal issue of validity.
Presumably, there need be no more identification of the issue than the announcement in the court's opinion, as had been common in the orders of trial
, Florida Statutes, is valid." But the inherency
courts, that "Section
20 5
doctrine announced in Harrell's Candy Kitchen is dearly no longer viable.
20s
As was mentioned above, section 3(b)(3) was added to the supreme court's
discretionary review jurisdiction as a corollary to the court's mandatory review
of district court decisions which declare statutes invalid. Discussions preceding
the adoption of the 1980 amendment 207 emphasized the discretionary aspect of
review in validity cases, for it was recognized that not all statutes are of statewide importance,20° that not all general laws declared valid require supreme
court consideration, 2°9 and that the court should have the freedom to restrict
its writing responsibilities by declining to review cases when it was thought
2 10
necessary.
Under the new provision, of course, the supreme court's denial of review
where a statute is upheld does not foreclose other challenges to the same statute
in the same 21 1 or in other appellate districts. Declining to review a validity case,
contours of the court's jurisdiction under the 1980 amendments will undoubtedly include
extensive discussions of jurisdiction so as to provide some guidance for attorneys and judges.
204. FLA. CONSr. art. V, § 3(b)(3).
205. See text accompanying notes 12-13, 121-122, supra.
206. See notes 100-101 and accompanying text, supra.
207. See text accompanying notes 103-108, supra.
208. See, e.g., Barndollar v. Sunset Realty Corp., 379 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 1979); North Ridge
General Hosp., Inc. v. City of Oakland Park, 874 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 1979).
209. See, e.g., Gaer v. State, 372 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1979); Grant v. State, 363 So. 2d 1063 (Fla.
1978).
210. If the district court of appeal gives adequate treatment to the issues xaised in a
proceeding, the supreme court should have the discretion to leave the district court's opinion
untouched. Indeed, it is not unusual for the court to adopt the district court's opinion as its
own. See, e.g., Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); Leatherby Ins. Co. v. American
Bankers Ins. Co., 871 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 1979); Ringel v. State, 366 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 1978).
211. A subsequent panel of the same district court could declare the statute invalid, or

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1980

37

Florida Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 2 [1980], Art. 1
UNIVERSITY

OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXHI

therefore, does not preclude a subsequent declaration of invalidity which the
court would be required to take, 212 another declaration of validity which might
persuade the court to grant a request for review, or a later certification of the
issue.213 In other words, by exercising its discretionary review with care, the
supreme court can avoid using its limited resources to analyze and write concerning a state statute which does not immediately appear to be controversial
or of current importance, safe in the knowledge that a decision not to review
will not forever insulate the legal issue from supreme court consideration.
One district court could declare a statute invalid "as applied" to one set of
circumstances, and another district court could declare the same statute valid
as applied to a similar set of circumstances. As suggested earlier, 214 an as applied
declaration of invalidity might not trigger mandatory review of the first decision. Of course, a declaration of validity, whether as applied or facially, does
not trigger mandatory review. The question arises whether two similarly situated persons might not have different results in their litigation, without
supreme court harmonization. The answer is "yes," of course. In these situations, however, the presence of close factual circumstances with conflicting
judicial interpretations might well persuade a district court to certify a case, 215
or the supreme court to accept discretionary review of either or both cases, in
order to reconcile the difference.
The Clerk of the supreme court has estimated that approximately 150 requests will be filed each year seeking to have reviewed district court declarations of statutory validity.216
(4) Construction of the constitution - section 3(b)(3)
The 1980 amendment provides that the supreme court
[m] ay review by-ee~tear4: any decision
court

of

appeal ....

vision of the

state

that

or

of a district
a profederal constitution ...7. =
expressly

construes

The "expressly" requirement continues by constitutional directive a judicial
doctrine which had grown up as a gloss on the earlier constitutional construc21 8
tion provision.
Prior to the adoption of this provision, review of district court decisions
construing a provision of the constitution was available only if that court was
the first court in the proceeding to make such a construction, such as might
occur when the constitutional issue arose during the pendency of appeal and
the full district court could consider a subsequent challenge to the same statute. See FLA. R.
App. P. 9.133.

212. A conflict of decisions would also then exist, but the mandatory jurisdiction of the
court would make invocation of discretionary conflict certiorari unnecessary.
213. See notes 257-264 and accompanying text, infra.
214. See note 133 and accompanying text, supra.
215. See notes 265-267 and accompanying text, infra.
216. Statistics obtained from the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Florida.
217. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3).
218. Ogle v. Pepin, 273 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 1973).
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had not been passed upon or dealt with by the parties in the trial court. 19 As

noted earlier, of course, the "initially and directly" requirements of the former
provision became unnecessary when trial court appeals were removed and the
0
"expressly" requirement was added. 22
Choice of the word "construes" in the new provision is advertent, carrying
forward the term as it appeared in section 3(b)(1) of the constitution before the
amendment was adopted. The shift of this provision from the court's manda-

tory to its discretionary jurisdiction provides no reason to suggest that prior
judicial interpretations of the term "construe" will not remain applicable. Decisions such as Armstrong v. City of Tampa,221 which differentiate the "construction" of a constitutional provision from the "application" of a provision, 222
would seem to be incorporated into the new provision of the constitution to

the same extent that they were embedded in the earlier version.
When constitutional constructions were brought to the supreme court by
way of mandatory appeal under former section 3(b)(1), the court sometimes concerned itself with the substantiality of the constitutional claim as a predicate
for its jurisdiction.223 By reclassifying review of constitutional constructions as
discretionary, the need for any discussion of substantiality has been wholly
eliminated. The court, however, can certainly consider the insubstantiality of
the issue as a basis to exercise its discretion to deny a request to review a constitutional construction.
Also made inconsequential by this constitutional shift is the court's recent
suggestion in State v. Coffin 224 that insubstantial constitutional questions
should be challenged by a motion to dismiss. Such motions will no longer be
necessary since the respondent, addressing the court's exercise of discretionary
review, may suggest the insubstantiality of the question in his jurisdictional
22 5
brief.
After the 1980 amendment, one district court could adopt a construction of
the federal or state constitution which differs from that of another district court,
and conceivably those differences would remain outstanding in the respective
appellate districts if the supreme court simply denied discretionary review in
both cases. This appears unlikely, however, if either of the differing constructions were brought to the court's attention by a petition for review.226 Differing
219. See, e.g., Foerster v. Foerster, 300 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1974), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part sub nom., Williams v. Foerster, 335 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 1976). See also In re Kionka's
Estate, 121 So. 2d 644, 646-47 (Fla. 1960) (O'Connell, J., concurring specially), which describes
three circumstances in which a district court may "initially" rule on the validity of a statute
or "initially" construe a constitutional provision. A fourth instance could occur during a
district court's review of administrative action. E.g., Wasserman v. Florida State Bd. of
Architecture, 361 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1978), rev'd, 377 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 1979).
220. See note 90 and accompanying text, supra.
221. 106 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 1958).
222. E.g., Dykman v. State, 294 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1973); Rojas v. State, 288 So. 2d 234 (FLn.
1973); Ogle v. Pepin, 273 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 1973).
223. See Evans v. Carroll, 104 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1958).
224. 374 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 1979).
225. See Commentary to FLA. RL APP. P. 9.120.
226. The petitioner in this instance could, of course, assert conflict of decisions as an
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constructions of the state or federal constitution pose problems for the jurisprudence of the entire state, comparable to those which would exist if a statute
were declared valid in one portion of the state and invalid in another. Consequently, these situations would seem to provide a most logical basis for the
court to exercise its jurisdiction in favor of review.
A more likely possibility, consistent with the constitutional reforms adopted,
is that a construction of the constitution in one district court in the first instance might not be reviewed by the supreme court for reasons of untimeliness,
workload, insubstantiality of issue, general agreement with the district court's
construction, or any other relevant consideration. In that event, the district
court's construction might well prove persuasive, although not technically
precedential, throughout the state, so that plenary supreme court review will
either be deferred or become wholly unnecessary.
The Clerk of the supreme court has estimated that approximately 80 requests will be filed each year seeking to have reviewed constructions of the
22 7
state or federal constitution.
(5) Class of constitutional or state officers - section 3(b)(3)
The 1980 amendment provides that the supreme court
[m]ay review by-ee Aerar any decision of a district
court of appeal ... that expressly affects a class of
228
constitutional or state officers ....
Before the 1980 amendment, the supreme court could review on a discretionary basis those district court decisions which affected a class of constitutional or state officers. The nature and extent of this review had been limited in
scope by Richardson v. State,229 and Spradley v. State.2 30 In Spradley, the court
stated that:
[a] decision which "affects a class of constitutional or state officers"
must be one which does more than simply modify or construe or add to
the caselaw which comprises much of the substantive and procedural law
of this state. Such cases naturally affect all classes of constitutional or
state officers, in that the members of these classes are bound by the law
the same as any other citizen. To vest this Court with certiorari jurisdiction, a decision must directly and, in some way, exclusively affect the
or regulation of a parduties, powers, validity, formation, termination
23
ticular class of constitutional or state officers. '
additional, independent ground for the exercise of certiorari jurisdiction. See notes 235-251 and
accompanying text, infra.
227. Statistics obtained from the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Florida.
228. FLA. CONsT. art. V, § 3(b)(3).
229. 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971).
230. 293 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 1974).
231. Id. at 701. This restrictive test announced in Spradley had an immediate and decisive
effect on the court's jurisdiction. As one justice observed in 1976: "My research indicates
that, dating from [Spradley's] adoption in May 1974 to the present, only two cases have been
accepted by this Court on the jurisdictional ground that a requisite class of officers was
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The 1980 amendment made no change in this jurisprudence. The operative
language of the provision remained unchanged, so that existing case law interpreting this provision would seem to have continuing vitality.
The 1980 amendment did, however, insert the word "expressly" before the
description of this portion of the court's discretionary jurisdiction. The requirement of an express written decision of the district court which affects
either a class of constitutional or state officers would seem to have little
practical impact, since virtually all of the cases which have come to the court
in recent years arose from written opinions of district courts articulating their
2 2
effect on the class.
Nonetheless, the preface "expressly" makes clear that the court is not free
to entertain review of a district court decision which counsel alleges affects a
class of state or constitutional officers, if the district court has written no

opinion on that legal point, In fact, the principal reason for the requirement
of "expressly" as regards this aspect of the court's jurisdiction was to prevent
a loophole in the court's discretionary review authority by which PCAs could
be brought to the court for review. 233 Members of the court following the legis-

lative evolution of SJR 20-C were well aware that judicial decisions can expand
or contract the court's jurisdiction, and they perceived that the Spradley
doctrine might someday be overruled or broadened to provide an open door
through which PCAs might once again be brought for review. The addition of
the word "expressly" to this aspect of the court's jurisdiction not only constitutionally foreclosed that possibility, but it further emphasized the court's inability to entertain through any device a district court PCA or its nonprecedential equivalent.
The Clerk of the supreme court has estimated that approximately 10 requests will be filed each year seeking review of decisions affecting a class of
254
constitutional or state officers.
(6) Conflict of decisions - section 3(b)(3)
The 1980 amendment provides that the supreme court
[m]ay review by-eer

erar

any decision of a district

court of appeal ... that expressly and directly con-

flicts ... with a decision of another any district
court of appeal or of the supreme court on the same
question of law ....235
affected by a district court's decision. Many assertions to that effect have been made, of course,
but only two have prevailed." Shevin v. Cenville Communities, Inc., 338 So. 2d 1281, 1282-83
(Fla. 1976) (England, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
232. E.g., Nelson v. Pinellas County, 343 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1977), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 362 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 1978); Taylor v. Tampa Elec. Co., 335 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 2d
D.CA. 1976), rev'd, 356 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1978). But see Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla.
4th D.C.A. 1978), aft'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980).
233. For a discussion of the use of the term "expressly" to prevent petitions for review
of PCAs, see notes 171-192 and accompanying text, supra.
234. Statistics obtained from the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Florida.
235. FLA. CoNsr.art. V, § 3(b)(3).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1980

41

Florida Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 2 [1980], Art. 1
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXnI

Prior to the 1980 amendment, the supreme court had discretionary authority
to review district court decisions which were in "direct conflict" either with any
other district court decisions or with decisions of the supreme court on the same
question of law. 236 The concept of "direct conflict" was carried forward in the
1980 amendment, with minor but important changes.
First, the amendment eliminated the notion of intra-district conflict - that
is, a direct conflict within any appellate district by reason of conflicting decisions of the same district court. This change restores the constitutional provision to its stature before 1972, when the constitution first authorized the re2
view of intra-district conflicts. s
In conjunction with the development of the 1980 amendment, there was a
question as to whether the notion of intra-district conflict was in fact possible,
since a decision of a three judge panel in one district which differs in result
from an earlier decision of another panel in the same district court would
seem to overrule the latter as precedent. Whatever the merits of that view, the
fact remains that the 1980 amendment eliminated any possibility that the
supreme court would review decisions alleging intra-district conflict.
The supreme court was cognizant, of course, of the possibility that multiple
panels of the same district court could achieve different legal results, possibly
inadvertently, on the same question of law.238 For that reason, and based on a
recommendation of the Appellate Structure Commission, 2 3 the court adopted,
effective January 1, 1980, a rule for an en banc review within the district courts
of any conflicting three judge panel decision. 240 Elimination of the court's
review of intra-district conflicts, combined with the creation of an en banc rehearing proceeding for intra-district conflict, results in potential supreme court
"conflict" review of (i) panel or en banc decisions of a district court which
conflict with a decision of another district court, and (ii) panel or en banc
41
decisions which conflict with a supreme court decision.2
The second significant change in the conflict jurisdiction of the supreme
court is the requirement that the district court decision must "expressly" be in
conflict. As discussed above, this new requirement means that the court will no
longer entertain alleged conflicts of appellate decisions which do not arise from
236. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3) (1972).
237. Compare FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3) (1972) and David v. State, 369 So. 2d 943 (Fla.
1979), with FLA. CONsT. art. V, § 4(2) (1956) and Grisillo v. Franklyn S., Inc., 173 So. 2d 682
(Fla. 1965).
238. E.g., Cumbie v. State, 378 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1978) and Nevels v. State, 364
So. 2d 517 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1978), cert. denied, 372 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 1979), resolved in State v.
Cumbie, 380 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 1980); David v. State, 348 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1977) and
Childers v. State, 277 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1973), resolved in David v. State, 369 So. 2d
943 (Fla. 1979).
239. Appellate Structure Commission Report, 53 FLA. B.J. 274, 279 (1979).
240. In re Rule 9.331, Determination of Causes by a District Court of Appeals En Banc,
377 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 1979).
241. Although the supreme court prohibits the district courts from deciding cases in
contradiction of a supreme court decision, a conflict can arise with a supreme court decision
rendered after the district court's decision and before the grant or denial of review by the
supreme court. See note 251 and accompanying text, infra.
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a written opinion of a district court. 242 With respect to this issue, there was
very little discussion among the framers of this provision, the bar committee,
the Appellate Structure Commission or the legislature, whether the term "expressly" would require that the conflict of law be identified and discussed in
the district court's opinion, or alternately whether a general statement of the
legal issue might be adequate to permit a petition for review based on an
asserted conflict of decisions. Given the strong desire of the bar for the retention of pre-existing conflict review, 243 which did not require district court
recognition of conflicting precedents, the latter view seems the more consistent
with the development of the amendment.
In light of the two limited intended effects of the 1980 amendment on the
court's conflict jurisdiction - that is, the elimination of intra-district conflict
and the requirement of a written opinion as a predicate for further review it is also clear that doctrines which had developed by case law under the prior
provision and which were not antithetical to the two changes would carry
forward after April 1, 1980. For example, the two basic types of "direct conflict" articulated in Nielsen v. City of Sarasota,2 - would seem to be continued. 245
On the other hand, the "expressly" requirement would seem to have eliminated
the review of those district court decisions without opinion which contain a
written dissent or a special written concurrence, where formerly counsel was
allowed to argue for so-called "dissent conflict '2 46 or "concurrence conflict."247
Plainly, the "expressly" requirement for district courts' majority decisions cannot be satisfied by a dissenting or concurring characterization of what the
majority has done. To this extent, numerous jurisdictional precedents appear
to have been overruled by the 1980 amendment.
"Uncertain" best characterizes the effect of the expressly requirement on
so-called "dicta conflict," where a written opinion of the district court discusses
legal points which are not germane to the decision (and therefore properly
classifiable as dicta) but which are nonetheless apparent on the face of the
opinion. Before the 1980 amendment, the court considered itself free to review
these cases, depending on their perceived importance for consideration and
resolution.2 48 No view is expressed as to the continuation of that practice.
242. See notes 184-186 and accompanying text, supra.
243. See notes 41-43 and accompanying text, supra.
244. 117 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 1960).
245. See Nielsen v. City of Sarasota, 117 So. 2d 731, 734 (Fla. 1960), discussing two types
of decisions properly reviewable as in direct conflict:
(1) decisions announcing a rule of law different from that announced in a previous district
court or supreme court decision; and
(2) decisions applying a rule of law to a set of facts substantially similar to that considered
in a previous district court or supreme court decision, but arriving at a disparate result.
246. E.g., David v. State, 369 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 1979); Keller v. Keller, 308 So. 2d 106 (Fla.
1974). See Golden Loaf Bakery v. Charles W. Rex Constr. Co., 334 So. 2d 585, 586 (Eta. 1976)
(England, J., concurring, suggesting infirmities in dissent conflict even before adoption of the
constitutional amendment); Williams v. State, 340 So. 2d 113, 116 (Fla. 1976) (England, J.,
dissenting, joined by Overton, C.J., and Hatchett, J.).
247. Rosenthal v. Scott, 131 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1961); State v. Greene, - So. 2d - (Fla. 4th
D.C.A.), petition for cert. docketed, No. 57,980 (Fla. Oct. 29, 1979).
248. E.g., Twomey v. Clausohm, 234 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1970); Sunad, Inc. v. City of
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The constitution retains a minor anomaly which preexisted the 1980
amendment, concerning which there was little discussion as the amendment
evolved. Previously, the constitution had allowed review of a district court
decision which directly conflicted with a decision of the supreme court on the
same question of law. After Hoffman v. Jones, 249 it became impermissible for a
district court to announce a decision in direct conflict with a previous decision
of the supreme court. Rather, the court was obliged to follow the directive of
the supreme court even if it chose to articulate reasons why the policy or
justification for the supreme court's earlier decision should no longer be
followed. The district court could, however, certify the legal question to the
2 50
court as one suitable for reconsideration.
As the sole intent of the "expressly" requirement of the 1980 amendment
was to require a written decision for review, and the sole intent for the language change from "any" to "another" was to eliminate intra-district conflict,
the amended provision contains the same anomaly which previously existed.
There is, however, a small area where decisional conflicts between the district
courts and the supreme court may operate. Although a district court cannot
decide a legal issue in direct conflict with a supreme court pronouncement on
the subject, any district court's decision could become in direct conflict with a
supreme court decision rendered after the district court has ruled.211 If a conflict of that type were to develop, either during the time available to seek
supreme court review (where the sole basis for review is that particular conflict) or before the supreme court acts on a petition for review otherwise properly filed (so that a notice of additional authority could be filed), then a direct
conflict with the supreme court could properly be brought to the court's attention or provide a basis for granting review.
Sarasota, 122 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1960). The legitimate differences of opinion between attorneys
and among the justices as to what is dicta and what is not suggests that dicta conflict may still
be available as a basis to request supreme court review. See State v. Embry, 322 So. 2d 515,
519 (Fla. 1975) (England, J., dissenting). See also Florida Greyhound Owners & Breeders
Ass'n, Inc. v. West Flagler Assocs., Ltd., 347 So. 2d 408, 410 n.6 (Fla. 1977) (England, J.,
concurring).
249. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
250. This was done in Johnson v. Bathey, 350 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1977), aff'd, 376
So. 2d 848 (Fla. 1979), wherein the district court expressly questioned the wisdom of Florida's
attractive nuisance doctrine yet, in accord with Hoffman, applied the existing rule. See also
Raisen v. Raisen, 370 So. 2d 1148 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1978), aff'd, 379 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1979).
251. E.g., Rose v. D'Alessandro, 364 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1978), rev'd in part, afJ'd
in part, 380 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 1980) (conflicting with Wait v. Florida Power & Light Co., 372
So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1979)); Brunson v. State, 355 So. 2d 812 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1978), reted, 369 So. 2d
945 (Fla. 1979) (conflicting with Hargrave v. State, 366 So. 2d I (Fla. 1978)). The opposite
effect is also possible, that is, a direct conflict of district court decisions can be dispelled between the filing of the district court decision and its review by the supreme court. See, e.g., St.
Johns Assocs. v. Mallard, 373 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1979) (where a later supreme court decision
dispelled preexisting conflict); Aiken v. State, - So. 2d - (Fla. 4th D.C.A.), petition for cert.
docketed, No. 56,671 (Fla. April 19, 1979) (pending after oral argument; respondent has
argued that decisional conflict between the Third and Fourth District Courts of Appeal was
dispelled by a later decision of the former court, adopted after certiorari had been filed in
the supreme court, receding from the conflicting decision in favor of the latter court's view).
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During discussions which led to the adoption of the 1980 provision, it was
estimated that 25 to 35 percent of the preamendment discretionary petitions
for conflict review arose from cases in which the district courts had written no
decision. 252 The elimination of these cases from the supreme court docket will
save judicial and administrative labor in the court in the processing and review
of those matters. It may be expected that the court will amend the appellate
rules to alter the format and size of jurisdictional briefs in conflict cases, and
amend its manual of internal procedures to state that attempts to file based on
alleged conflict found in district court decisions without opinions will be returned to the petitioning attorney by the clerk's office, without being seen by
any justice or his staff.
The Clerk of the supreme court estimates that conflict review petitions will
continue to provide the bulk of the court's discretionary cases, or approximately
1,200 cases per year.2 3
(7) Interlocutory trial court orders - formerly section 3(b)(3)
The 1980 amendment provides that the supreme court
[m] ay review by-eeterary

...

eny-intereeutery-erdeL

5e-g:eetly-alpealable-te-the-st

eme-eeu

....254

This provision removed all supreme court review of interlocutory orders of

the trial courts. The reasons for routing all cases through the district courts
have been previously explored. 255 By eliminating the review of interlocutory
orders of trial courts, the 1980 amendment also made moot the doctrine of
Burnsed v. Seaboard Coastline RR,25 6 which construed former sections 3(b)(1)

and 3(b)(3) as they related to such interlocutory orders. The gist of that decision
was that the court would review only final, as opposed to interlocutory, orders
of trial courts, under section 3(b)(1).
(8) Certified questions of great public importance- section 3(b)(4); formerly
section 3(b)(3)
The 1980 amendment provides in section 3(b)(4) that the supreme court
[m]lay review any decision of a district court of apappeal that passes upon a question certified by it to
be of great public importance
The 1980 amendment moved the supreme court's discretionary review of
district court decisions that pass upon a question certified by the district court

252. Statistics obtained from the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Florida.
253. Statistics obtained from the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Florida.
254. FLA. Co sr. art. V, § 3(b)(3).

255. See notes 87-97 and accompanying text, supra.
256. 290 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1974).
257. FLA. CONST. art. V, § S(b)(4).
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from old section 3(b)(3) to new section 3(b)(4). The sole change is that the
word "interest" has now become "importance."
The development of this provision suggests that this terminology change
has limited significance. As various proposals for constitutional change wound
their way through the Appellate Structure Commission, The Florida Bar,
the House Judiciary Committee and the Senate Judiciary Committee, the provision in section 3(b)(3) granting the supreme court jurisdiction over district
court decisions affecting a class of constitutional or state officers was deleted as
unnecessary in light of the narrow construction given it in Spradley.258 It was
generally believed this subject area could safely be left to certified questions if
the operative phrase were expanded to encompass questions of great public
"importance." The day before the amendment was actually adopted, however,
the sheriffs' and clerks' associations urged that the "class" category be restored.259 There being no serious reason to reject the associations' suggestion, the
restoration was effected on the floor of the Senate.6 0 Although the change in
terminology from great public "interest" to great public "importance" became
unnecessary, there was no time before final Senate passage to restore the original
wording, or even to explain the justification for so doing.
The term "great public importance" in section 3(b)(4), consequently, should
be given content similar to that which "great public interest" had in former
section 3(b)(3).261 This content would include, for example, the review of a
district court decision even if the question were not precisely framed in that
decision, although the failure to frame a clear question has always been
2 2
strongly discouraged. 6
Finally, of course, there is no doubt that under the new provision, as under
the predecessor provision, the supreme court may decline for any reason to
review any legal question which has been certified.263 The Clerk of the supreme
court estimates that approximately 35 decisions will be certified to the court
2 64
under this provision each year.
(9) Certified conflict - section 3(b)(4)
The 1980 amendment provides that the supreme court

258. See note 231 and accompanying text, supra.
259. House Committee Hearingson H.J. Res. 33-C, Nov. 27, 1979, supra note 66 (remarks
of Jack M. Skelding, Jr.).
260. See app. C.
261. This change of language may broaden slightly the scope of the provision. Indeed,
the commentary to the 1980 amendments to the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure states
that "[t]he change was to recognize the fact that some legal issues may have 'great public importance,' but may not be sufficiently known by the public to have 'great public interest.' In re
Emergency Amendments to Rules of Appellate Procedure, 381 So. 2d 1370 (Fla. 1980). The
actual effect of the change, of course, must await future developments in the case law.
262. Rupp v. Jackson, 238 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1970). But see Lake Region Packing Assoc. v.
Furze, 327 So. 2d 212, 217 (Fla. 1976) (England, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
263. See Zirin v. Charles Pfizer ge Co., 128 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 1961).
264. Statistics obtained from the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Florida.
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[m]ay review any decision of a district court of appeal ... that is certified by it to be in direct
conflict with a decision of another district court
65
I
of appeal. 2
This provision is entirely new, and expands the instances for district court

certification to situations in which a direct conflict of decisions among the districts is perceived by the district court. In the years 1978 and 1979, the dist-ict
courts actually commented on conflicting appellate court decisions in 25 percent
of their decisions brought by attorneys and accepted by the supreme court on
the basis of conflict certiorari. 266 This provision adds to the district court's
arsenal the authority to certify the more important decisional conflicts for
supreme court reconciliation.
The Clerk of the supreme court estimates that approximately 20 decisions
will be certified to the court under this provision each year. 267
(10) Certified trial court orders - section 3(b)(5)
The 1980 amendment provides that the supreme court
court
[m]ay review any order or judgment of a trial
certified by the district court of appeal in which
an appeal is pending to be of great public importance, or to have a great effect on the proper administration of justice throughout the state, and certified to require immediate resolution by the su268
preme court.
The 1980 amendment authorizes the supreme court to review, in its discretion, orders or judgments of trial courts which have been certified by a district
court either as being of great public importance or as having a great effect on
the proper administration of justice throughout the state. A requisite to review,
however, and therefore a necessary part of the district court's certification, is
also a determination by the district court that the matter certified requires an
immediate resolution by the supreme court. This provision can only be understood in the context of its development.
Under the constitution as it existed before the 1980 amendment, some trial
court orders which either passed on the validity of a statute or which construed
the state or federal constitutions would be appealed directly to the supreme
court. 2- If the court's immediate attention were required, either of the parties
to the lawsuit could ask the court to expedite consideration of the matter, or
265. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(4).
266. See Statistics obtained from Appellate Structure Commission (memorandum from
Elaine Williams to Justice Overton (Mar. 1, 1979)).
267. Statistics obtained from the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Florida.
268. FLA. CoNsT. art. V, § (b)(5).
269. See note 88 and accompanying text, supra.
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the court on its own motion could recognize the urgency of a particular case
and process it ahead of others. The appeal process had been so abused, however,
with attorneys rather than the justices holding the potential control of the
supreme court's docket, that the framers of the 1980 amendment unanimously
agreed on the need to eliminate all direct appeals from trial courts (except in
death penalty and bond validation cases) throughout the developmental stage
2 70
of the amendment.
Nonetheless, the framers were aware that on a limited number of occasions
the proper administration of justice throughout the state required a prompt
resolution of certain matters by the supreme court. The Appellate Structure
Commission, for example, had fresh in mind the chaos which had developed
in the administration of the traffic laws due to the uncertain validity of a 1977
statute requiring the collection of fines and penalties on each traffic offense as
a means of funding a Crimes Compensation Commission.2 7 ' By the time the
supreme court received and concluded the case which tested the validity of that
statute2 7 2 millions of dollars had been collected in small amounts by clerks
throughout the state. The court's decision declaring the statute invalid necessitated the return of a portion of those collections, creating severe administrative hardships and some injustices.
The proper administration of justice throughout the state was also severely
affected by trial judges' variant interpretations of a statute which created a
bifurcated proceeding for criminal proceedings in which the defense of insanity
was raised.273 By the time the supreme court decided that the new enactment
was invalid,27 4 many new trials were required to unwind the disparate effects of
27 5
these varying interpretations of the law.

The need for an expeditious method by which the state's highest court
could resolve cases of this type was identified in the 1979 Report on the
Florida Judiciary, submitted to the 1979 legislature by the chief justice6 To
meet this need, that report contained a recommendation of the Appellate
Structure Commission277 that the constitution permit the court to "reach-down,"
and pull up for expeditious treatment those cases in the lower courts which
required immediate resolution. As stated earlier278 this provision generated
considerable controversy in the legislature and among bar members, although
it had been approved by the Judicial Council.
During the summer of 1979 when members of the court, the bar and the
Appellate Structure Commission reconsidered the so-called "reach-down" provision, two possibilities emerged as a necessary "safety valve" for the system.
One, which was later rejected, required a certification from a trial court judge
270. See notes 93-97 and accompanying text, supra.
271. 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-452.
272. State v. Champe, 373 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1978).
273. 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-312.
274. State ex rel. Boyd v. Green, 355 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1978).
275. See, e.g., Freeman v. State, 377 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 1979); Ashcraft v. State, 867 So. 2d
630 (Fla. 1979).
276. 1979 Report, supra note 33, 53 FLA. B.J. at 299-800.
277. Id. at 300.
278. See notes 36-40 and accompanying text, supra.
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or from the chief judge of any judicial circuit with respect to which cases
required immediate supreme court attention. The other was the district court
certification process which was written into the 1980 amendment.
The rationale for the provision which was adopted is essentially twofold.
First, there must be some way in the judicial system by which the supreme
court can obtain and decide promptly those cases which have an immediate
statewide impact on the administration of justice. Second, by allowing an appeal to take its ordinary course from a judgment or order of a trial court to a
district court of appeal, the extra delay over direct processing in the supreme
court would be, at the maximum, the amount of time taken by the district
court to identify the need and act on the certification. Upon receipt of the

appeal papers, a district court may on its own motion or at the request of any
party279 immediately certify the matter to the supreme court in order to avoid
the delay inherent in rendering a decision at the district court level.
This "bypass" provision has counterparts in other judicial systems. Indeed,
the famous Nixon tapes case 2s0 decided by the United States Supreme Court
came directly from a decision of district court Judge John Sirica under a procedure very much like the one which now appears as section 3(b)(5).281
As the bypass provision was developed in various drafting stages, the certification authority was conferred only where the matter might involve a question
of great public importance. The alternate phrase, "or to have a great effect on
the proper'administration of justice throughout the state," had previously
appeared in the Appellate Structure Commission2s2 recommendation for a rule
proceeding by which the supreme court could decide which cases it would take
under the then proposed "reach-down" authority. The Senate thought the
latter phrase had significance beyond that of "great public importance," and it
was therefore added to section 8(b)(5) by the Senate drafting subcommittee and
staff during the short November special session at which the constitutional
proposal was adopted. 28 3 When hastily consulted as to the wisdom of this provision, or by then the difficulty of having it removed, members of the bar, the
court and others who were monitoring the amendment elected to leave the
language in as an alternate predicate for certification. It was generally believed
that the language was not harmful, although it did not add anything of significance to the "great public importance" test. Section 3(b)(5) now provides,
however, two alternate bases for the certification of trial court orders requiring
immediate resolution. It remains for the courts to define or distinguish those
two concepts.
The most important aspect of section 3(b)(5) is its clearly narrow intended
application. Not more than two or three cases each year are expected to be
certified to the supreme court under this provision. A great deal of responsibil279. The supreme court has tentatively promulgated rules implementing this procedure.
FLA. R. App. P. 9.125, as adopted in In re Emergency Amendments to Rules of Appellate
Procedure, 381 So. 2d 1370 (Fla. 1980).
280. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).

281. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254(1), 2101(c) (1976).
282.
283.

1979 Report, supra note 33,53 FLA. B.J. at 300.
Senate Committee Hearings on S.J. Res. 20-C, Nov. 26, 1979, supra note 47.
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ity will repose with the district court judges to distinguish inappropriate cases
for which no certification would be appropriate from all those certifications
requested by individual litigants. Inevitably, some cases may be certified because they seem to the district court judges politically sensitive in their geographic area of the state. If these cases do not require immediate resolution in
order to resolve difficult questions of law having an important impact throughout the state, the supreme court may well decline immediate review and return
28 4
the case for normal handling.
(11) Questions certified from federal courts - section 3(b)(6)
The 1980 amendment provides that the supreme court
[m)ay review a question of law certified by the Supreme Court of the United States or a United States
Court of Appeals which is determinative of the cause
and for which there is no controlling precedent of
285
the supreme court of Florida.
The 1980 amendment provides express authority for the supreme court to
consider questions of state law certified from federal appellate courts which are
dispositive of litigation pending in the federal judicial system. Before the
amendment there was no comparable provision in the constitution, although
the supreme court had provided by rule2s 6 and judicial decision 28 7 for the
receipt and disposition of these types of questions, and the legislature had
authorized their being entertained by statute.288 The language of section
3(b)(6) is precisely the language which formerly governed these types of decisions under the statute, the rule and case law. 28 9 Accordingly, the addition
of this provision to the constitution can be seen as no more than a constitutional codification of existing authority for the supreme court to deal with
such cases. The representations of the framers of this provision to legislative
29 0
committees were, in fact, all to that effect.

284. The court's temporary rules to implement the 1980 amendment state that the record
should be retained in the district court until the court has exercised its discretion to accept or
reject review. If review is rejected, the case will simply remain in the district court for a
resolution of the appeal in that forum. FLA. R. Ap. P. 9 .125(g), as adopted in In re Emergency
Amendments to Rules of Appellate Procedure, 381 So. 2d 1370 (Fla. 1980).
285. FLA. CONsT. art. V, § 3(b)(6).
286. FLA. R. AP. P. 9.510.
287. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 1977); Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay,
138 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 1961)

(upholding the constitutionality of the federal court certification

process).
288. FLA. STAT. § 25.031 (1979).
289. Federal courts have made regular use of the certification process. See, e.g., Greene v.
Massey, 595 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1979); Everglades Marina, Inc. v. American E. Dev. Corp., 374
So. 2d 517 (Fla. 1979); Cesary v. Second Nat'l Bank, 369 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 1979).
290. Senate Committee Hearings on S.J. Res. 20-C, Nov. 26, 1979, supra note 47 (remarks
of Chief Justice England).
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The Clerk of the supreme court estimates that federal appellate courts will

continue to send the court approximately 5 cases per year.291
(12) Writs of prohibition to courts and commissions - section 3b)(7); formerly
section 3(b)(4)
The 1980 amendment provides that the supreme court
[m]ay issue writs of prohibition to courts end-eem- ,
si
eme-eoue-t-2eviewT and all writs necessary
to
292
the complete exercise of its jurisdiction.
When the supreme court's authority to review administrative action was
narrowed to the limited category described earlier, conforming amendments
were made to other provisions of the constitution which had conferred broader'
authority either by direct review or by writs of prohibition. Former section
3(b)(7), of course, was deleted in its entirety by the 1980 amendment,2 9 3 and
was replaced with the narrower section 3(b)(2). Section 3(b)(3) was amended to
delete certiorari jurisdiction over statewide commissions.
Former section 3(b)(4) was also altered to delete language which had conferred express authority on the supreme court to issue writs of prohibition to
commissions in causes within the jurisdiction of the supreme court to review.
The framers of the 1980 amendment considered whether the deletion of that
express authority to issue this type of extraordinary writ to commissions would
preclude the issuance of a writ of prohibition to the Public Service Commission
- the only agency having statewide jurisdiction over the rates and service of
electric, gas and telephone companies. They concluded it would not. The
authority to issue writs of prohibition, as well as any other appropriate extraordinary writ directed to that agency, was retained through section 3(b)(7),
where the court is authorized to issue all writs necessary to the complete ex29
ercise of its jurisdiction. '
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Several general conclusions may be drawn from the adoption of the 1980
amendment, and several recommendations are appropriate.
1. District court judges have been given more responsibility under the con-

291.

292.

Statistics obtained from the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Florida.
FLA. CONsr. art. V, § 3(b)(7).

293. See notes 146-156 and accompanying text, supra.
294. The "all writs" power of the supreme court has been defined to exclude writs which
initiate jurisdiction in the court, as opposed to those which are necessary after jurisdiction is
otherwise properly invoked. Besoner v. Crawford, 357 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 1978); Shevin ex rel.
State v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 333 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1976). Contra, Couse v. Canal Auth., 209 So. 2d
865 (Fla. 1968). Accordingly, the constitution does not give the court authority to issue an
original writ of prohibition to the Public Service Commission (or any other statewide agency
falling within the ambit of the court's authority under § 3(b)(2)), absent an independent basis
for the court's jurisdiction.
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stitution for the finality of judicial decisions and for the control of cases which
might come to the supreme court for review.
(a) Additional authority has been granted district court judges to certify
urgent matters of great public importance under the bypass provision, and to
certify direct conflicts in district court decisions.
(b) Under the supreme court's rule providing for en banc rehearings, intradistrict conflicts will be resolved within the district courts so that district court
judges can deal en banc with important matters which are deemed suitable for
full court analysis.
(c) A decision not to write an opinion in any particular case may be dispositive of the litigation. Therefore, district court judges will play a significant role
in the state's justice system by the exercise of their judgment in this regard. No
one questions the desirability of some dispositions without opinion at the
district court level, for example, in cases which involve a straightforward application of existing law to individual and non-unique fact situations. On the
other hand, the responsibility for articulating decisions on questions of law
which might have statewide importance, or which might be in conflict with
other appellate decisions, now rests more heavily on the district courts' judges.
Perhaps greater precision will also be required of counsel to isolate, identify
and discuss the issues of law which they present to the district courts.
2. The district courts appear to be candidates for more rehearing petitions,
because of the en banc rehearing rules and the restrictions on supreme court
review in certain categories of cases. New district court procedures may be
necessary to accommodate this new round of rehearing requests. Ideally, uniformity will be achieved through the development of rules by the district courts
for submission to the supreme court for adoption.
3. The extent to which the supreme court finds its necessary or desirable to
identify and discuss in its opinions the bases for accepting jurisdiction in discretionary cases will, to a large extent, determine whether the 1980 amendment
achieved all of the economies it was designed to accomplish. Notwithstanding
the desirability of the court's attempts to guide review-seekers by articulating
reasons for the exercise or nonexercise of the court's discretion, numerous commentators, commissioners and bar members condemned the extraordinary waste
of judicial effort over the years from the supreme court's discussion of those
matters. 29 5 The extensive case law defining "conflict certiorari," "questions of
great public interest," "classes of constitutional or state officers," "record
proper" and the like, highlights a loss of the justices' otherwise valuable time.
The clear intent of the framers of the 1980 amendment was to relieve the
court of the time-consuming process of explaining the basis for an acceptance
or rejection of jurisdiction. It is true, of course, that those who opposed the
1980 amendment (because it created categories of review, rather than allowing unlimited discretionary review) argued that categorical "pigeon holes"
would necessitate the same kind of judicial effort which has heretofore hindered
the substantive decision-making responsibilities of the court. 298 Probably, strong295. See note 200 and accompanying text, supra.
296.

Letter from Tobias Simon to members of The Florida Bar, 4-5 app. (Jan. 7, 1980).
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minded justices will debate the exercise of jurisdiction in terms of their analysis
of the revised constitutional pigeon holes. Nonetheless, there is no compelling
reason for the court to articulate its reasons for exercising jurisdiction in every
particular case, and many who proposed and supported the 1980 amendment
hope that the court would dispense with that practice for the most part. It remains to be seen whether the justices will view the revised constitution in this
light.
4. Additional and revised appellate rules will be necessary to govern the

procedures by which cases come to the supreme court and are considered in the
district courts. 297 Amendments to the supreme court's Manual of Internal Operating Procedures will, of course, also be needed.
Among the new rules that should be developed is a new page limitation for
review petitions filed with the supreme court. During the debates leading to
the adoption of the 1980 amendment, it was frequently suggested that review
petitions should be limited to five page applications by attorneys, simply stating
the district court decision and attaching a copy of the court's opinion.298 A page
or two might be needed to identify the law in conflict, the class affected, or the
like, but the bulk of the five pages would be devoted to a discussion of the
reasons for exercising review.
A limitation on the size of jurisdictional briefs is consistent with the amendment in another respect. Extensive discussions of the basis for jurisdiction
appear less necessary now that all district courts' opinions must "expressly"
discuss or mention the issue or issues of law which are brought for review. A required copy of the district court's opinion to a large extent will obviate the
need for an advocate's paraphrasing.
5. The district courts should give special attention to those decisions which
declare a statute valid, and are thereby eligible for discretionary review by the
supreme court. If a district court elects not to write an opinion, but simply
adopts a trial court order, it would seem desirable to reproduce the trial court's
order in the district court's decision. In that way, not only the parties but the
general public will know what statute has been passed upon. Where that is not
done, but the requisite jurisdiction for review is conferred by a simple announcement that the statute has been upheld, counsel should at least include as
an appendix to the review petition a copy of the trial court's order which articulates the reasons for that action (if a written expression from the trial judge is
available).
6. The 1980 amendment will not provide a leisurely pace for the supreme
court's justices; certainly, never again in the range of 450 cases which the court
considered in 1957. The estimated, annual caseload will be 2090, consisting of
approximately 70 mandatory appeals, 1500 discretionary petitions for review,
and all other matters (totaling 520 in 1979) which are unaffected by the changes
297. On March 27, 1980, the court temporarily adopted a series of emergency amendments
to the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure to govern all proceedings within their scope after
12:01 a.m., April 1, 1980 (the effective date of the 1980 amendment). In re Emergency Amendments to Rules of Appellate Procedure, 381 So. 2d 1370 (Fla. 1980). Cases pending in the
court prior to April 1, 1980, will continue to be governed by the former rules. Id. at 1371.
298. See app. D.
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- such as extraordinary writs, practice and procedure rules, bar admissions and
disciplinary action, judicial discipline and advisory opinions to the governor.
Thus, although jurisdictionally streamlined, the Supreme Court of Florida will
remain one of the nation's high volume high courts. Although the amendment
becomes effective on April 1, 1980, the effects of the 1980 amendment will not
be realized until at least 1981 because the backlog of pending cases will occupy
the justices for a significant period of time.
7. By redefining the supreme court's jurisdiction, the 1980 amendment
provided the opportunity for the district courts, the attorneys of Florida, and
particularly the justices of the supreme court to redefine the role of the supreme
court in Florida's judicial system. The clear import of the change has been to
free the court from non-policy types of decisions, and direct its efforts to issues
of statewide importance or jurisprudential significance. The opportunity to
exercise the new role requires a collective mentality which perceives the court
as a limited policy-maker and law-harmonizer, rather than just a second level
of trial reviewer for every litigant. Should the justices lose the mantle of restrained supremacy which the amendment invites them to don, or should the
justices allow the bar to diminish the court's proper role with importunings for
trivia, many of the benefits conferred by the amendment will have been lost.
Should that occur, and an attendant new round of caseload pressures, revised
internal screening procedures, and delayed dispositions ensue, the justices themselves must bear direct responsibility for the consequences.
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APPENDIX A
Senate Joint Resolution No. 20-C
A joint resolution proposing an amendment to Section 3, Article V of the State Constitution,
relating to the organization and jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court.
Be It Resolved by the Legislature of the State of Florida:
That the following amendment-to Section 3 of Article V
of the State Constitution is hereby agreed to and shall be
submitted to the electors of this state for approval or
rejection at a special election to be held in conjunction
with the presidential preference primary election in March
1980; and which, if approved, shall take effect April 1,
1980.
ARTICLE V
JUDICIARY
SECTION 3.

Supreme court.-

(a) ORGANIZATION.-The supreme court shall consist of
Of the seven justices, each appellate
seven justices.
district shall have at least one justice elected or appointed from the district to the supreme court who is a
resident of the district at the time of his original appointment or election. Five justices shall constitute a
quorum. The concurrence of four justices shall be necessary to a decision. When recusals for cause would prohibit the court from convening because of the requirements of
this section, judges assigned to temporary duty may be
substituted for justices.
(b) JURISDICTION.--The supreme court:
(1) Shall hear appeals from final judgments of trial
r-%al
courts imposing the death penalty and from orders-

eetirs--and decisions of district courts of appeal declaring.invalid a state statute or a provision of the state
CODING:
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(2) When provided by general law, shall hear appeals
from final judgments
ea
entered in proceedings for the validation of bonds or certificates of indebtedness and shall review action of statewide agencies
relating to rates or service of utilities providing electric, gas, or telephone service.
(3) May review by-eertierari any decision of a district
court of appeal that expressly declares valid a state
statute, or that expressly construes a provision of the
state or federal constitution, or that expressly affects a
class of constitutional or state officers r--taet--a-ses
be-eE-gteat-p &-e-&nteest, or that expressly and directwith a decision of
ly conflicts
another any- district court of appeal or of the supreme
court on the same question of law--an-y--nterleeutevy
is sue-w

r&-ei ----

t-e
i--oe--

-it-ee1a
-ei

shed-by

(4) May review any decision of a district court of appeal that passes upon a question certified by it to be of
great public importance, or that is certified by it to be
in direct conflict with a decision of another district
court of appeal.
(5) May review any order or judgment of a trial court
certified by the district court of appeal in which an appeal is pending to be of great public importance, or to
have a great effect on the proper administration of justice throughout the state, and certified to require immediate resolution by the supreme court.
(6) May review a question of law certified by the Supreme Court of the United States or a United States Court
CODING:
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of Appeals which is determinative of the cause and for
which there is no controlling precedent of the supreme
court of Florida.
(7)44* May issue writs of prohibition to courts and
eemmissiens--in
preme-eeut-te-revlew 7 and all writs necessary to the complete exercise of its jurisdiction.
(8)_* May issue writs of mandamus and quo warranto to
state officers and state agencies.
(9)- 6* May, or any justice may, issue writs of habeas
corpus returnable before the supreme court or any justice,
a district court of appeal or any judge thereof, or any
circuit judge.
trative-aetien-prese.:e4:e-by-geneval-lawT
(c) CLERK AND MARSHAL.--The supreme court shall appoint
a clerk and a marshal who shall hold office during the
pleasure of the court and perform such duties as the court
directs.
Their compensation shall be fixed by general
law. The marshal shall have the power to execute the
process of the court throughout the state, and in any
county may deputize the sheriff or a deputy sheriff for
such purpose.
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the following statement
placed on the ballot:

be

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
ARTICLE V, SECTION 3
Proposing an amendment to the State Constitution

to

modify the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
Filed in Office Secretary of State November 29,
CODING:

1979.

Words in struekeugh type are deletions from
existing law; words in underscored type are additions.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1980

57

Florida Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 2 [1980], Art. 1
UNIVERSITY

OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXJI

APPENDIX B
JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
November 28, 1979

Messages from the Senate

The Honorable J. Hyatt Brown, Speaker
I am directed to inform the House of Representatives
that the Senate has passed as amended, by the required
constitutional three-fifths vote of all members elected to
the Senate, SJR 20-C, and request the concurrence of the
House.
Joe Brown, Secretary
By Committee on Judiciary-CivilSJR 20-C-A joint resolution proposing an amendment to
Section 3, Article V of the State Constitution, relating
to the organization and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
Be It Resolved by the Legislature of the State of Florida:
That the following amendment to Section 3 of Article V
of the State Constitution is hereby agreed to and shall be
submitted to the electors of this state for approval or
rejection at a special election to be held in conjunction
with the presidential preference primary election in March
1980; and which, if approved, shall take effect April 1,
1980.
[The full text is printed in appendix A, supral
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the following statement be
placed on the ballot:
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
ARTICLE V, SECTION 3
Proposing an amendment to the State Constitution
modify the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
-was read
Thompson, the

to

the first time by title. On motions by Mr.
rules were waived and SJR 20-C was read the
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second time by title and the third time by title.
sage, the vote was:

On pas-

Yeas-107
Bankhead
Barrett
Batchelor
Beard
Bell
Boles
Brantley
Burnsed
Bush
Campbell
Carlton
Carpenter
Conway
Cox
Crady
Crawford
Crotty
Danson
Davis
Deratany
Dunbar
Dyer
Easley
Evans
Ewing
Flinn
Flynn

Foster
Fox
Gallagher
Gersten
Girardeau
Gustafson
Haben
Hagler
Hattaway
Hawkins, L. R.
Hawkins, M. E.
Hazouri
Healey
Hi.eber
Hodges
Hollingsworth
Jennings
Johnson, A. E.
Johnson, B. L.
Johnson, R. C.
Jones, C. F.
Jones, D. L.
Kelly
Kershaw
Kirkwood
Kiser
Kutun

Lehman
Lewis, J.
Lewis, T.
Liberti
Lippman
Mann
Margolis
Martin
Martinez
McCall
McPherson
Meek
Melby
Mica
Mills
Mitchell
Moffitt
Morgan
Myers
Nergard
Muckolls
Ogden
O'Malley
Pajcic
Patchett
Patterson
Plummer

Price
Ready
'Richmond
Robinson
RosenRyals
Sadowski
Sample
Shackelford
Sheldon
Silver
Smith, C. R.
Smith, J. H.
Smith, L. J.
Spaet
Thomas
Thompson
Tygart
Upchurch
Ward
Warner
Watt
Weinstock
Williams
Woodruff
Young

Nays-1
Burrall
Votes after roll call:
Yeas-Malloy, Allen, Hodes, Hector
Yeas to Nays-Flynn
So the joint resolution passed by the required Constitution~l three-fifths vote of the membership and- was immediately certified to the Senate,
The Honorable J. Hyatt Brown, Speaker

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1980

59

Florida Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 2 [1980], Art. 1
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXHI

I am directed to inform the House of Representatives
that the Senate has passed by the required constitutional
three-fourths vote of all members elected to the Senate SB
21-C, and requests the concurrence of the House.
Joe Brown, Secretary

By the Committee on Judiciary-CivilSB 21-C-A bill to be entitled An act relating to a
special election to be held on March 11, 1980, pursuant to
Section 5 of Article XI of the State Constitution, for the
approval or rejection by the electors of a joint resolution amending Section 3 of Article V of the State Constitution relating to the judiciary; providing for publication of notice and for procedures; providing an effective
date.
-was read the first time by title. On motions by Mr.
Thompson, the rules were waived and SB 21-C was read the
second time by title and the third time by title. On passage, the vote was:
Yeas-113
The Chair
Allen
Bankhead
Barrett
Batchelor
Beard
Bell
Boles
Brantley
Burnsed
Burrall
Bush
Campbell
Carlton
Carpenter
Conway
Cox
Crady
Crawford
Crotty
Danson
Davis

Deratany
Dunbar
Dyer
Easley
Eckhart
Evans
Ewing
Flinn
Flynn
Foster
Fox
Gallagher
Gardner
Gersten
Girardeau
Gustafson
Haben
Hagler
Hall
Hattaway
Hawkins, L. R.
Hawkins, M. E.
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Hazouri
Healey
Hector
Hieber
Hodes
Hodges
Hollingsworth
Jennings
Johnson, A. E
Johnson, B. L
Johnson, R. C
Jones, C. F.
Jones, D. L.
Kelly
Kershaw
Kirkwood
Kiser
Kutun
Lehman
Lewis, J. W.
Lewis, T. F.
Liberti

Lippman
Lockward
Mann
Margolis
Martin
Martinez
McCall
McPherson
Meek
Melby
Mica
Mills
Mitchell
Moffitt
Morgan
Myers
Nergard
Nuckolls
Ogden
O'Malley
Pajcic
Patchett

60

England et al.: Constitutional Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Florida: 1980

1980] .
Patterson
Plummer
Price
Richmond
Robinson
Rosen
Ryals
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Sample
Shackelford
Sheldon
Silver
Smith, C. R.
Smith, J. H.

Smith. L.-J.
Spaet
Thomas
Thompson
Upchurch
Ward

Warner
Watt
Weinstock
Williams
Woodruff
Young

Votes after roll call:
Yeas-Malloy
So the bill passed by the required Constitutional threefourths vote of the memberhsip and was immediately certified to the Senate
APPENDIX C

JOURNAL OF THE SENATE
November 28, 1979
SJR 20-C-A joint resolution proposing an amendment to
Section 3, Article V of the State Constitution, relating
to the organization and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
-was

read the second time.

The Committee on Judiciary-Civil offered the following
amendment which was moved by Senator Hair and failed:
Amendment 1-On page 2, line 9, after the word "Commission" insert:

,

or its successor,

Senator Hair moved the following amendment which was
adopted:
Amendment 2-On page 2, strike all of line 9 and insert:

review action of statewide agencies
Legislative Intent
At the request of Senator Myers, by direction of the
President the following statements were published in the
Journal:
Senator Myers: To clarify the term "statewide agency"
so that we have a clear expression of legislative intent
in the record on this, I want to ask Senator Hair a question so that he can give me the answer and perhaps put
that in the Senate Journal.
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Mr. President:
Senator Hair:

[V'ol. XXXII

Does Senator yield?
I yield,

Senator Myers: Senator Hair, to clarify the matter, is
it true that the term "statewide agency" will comport with
the term "state agency" in chapter 120 insofar as review
of orders of the Public Service Commission are concerned
to the District Court of Appeal now that you are changing
it, or to the Supreme Court with respect to electric,
telephone and gas cases?
Senator Hair:

That's correct.

Senator Myers: So that even though you have a difference of terminology between "statewide agency" in the constitutional language and the
definition designated as
"state agency" in chapter 120, insofar as review of Public
Service Commission orders are concerned to
respective
courts they are one and the same,
Senator Hair:

That's correct.

Senator Myers: I would respectfully request that this
be shown in the Senate Journal as a direct statement of
legislative intent, so we have a clear understanding,
since there is a difference in terminology between "statewide agency" as used in this Constitutional amendment, and
the definition "state agency" under Chapter 120.
The Committee on Judiciary-Civil offered the following
amendment which was moved by Senator Hair and adopted:
Amendment 3-On page 2, lines 11 and 12, strike "'and
shall review agency action of the Florida Commission on
Ethics"

Senator Hair moved the following
adopted:

amendment which was

Amendment 4-On page 2, line 16, strike "tha-efeet5s-a
and insert:
or that expressly affects a class of constitutional or
state officers,
On motion by Senator Hair, by two-thirds vote SJR 20-C
as amended was read the third time in full as follows:
A joint resolution proposing an amendment to Section 3,
Article V of the State Constitution, relating to the organization and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
[The full text is printed in appendix A, supra.]
ea
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BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the
placed on the ballot:

following statement be

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
ARTICLE V, SECTION 3
Proposing an amendment to the State Constitution
modify the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

to

On motion by Senator Hair, SJR 20-C as amended passed
by the required constitutional three-fifths vote of the
membership and was certified to the House. The vote on
passage was:
Yeas-34
Mr. President
Anderson
Barron
Chamberlin
Childers, D.
Childers, W. D.
Fechtel
Frank
Gorman

Grizzle
Hair
Henderson
Hill
Holloway
Jenne
Johnston
MacKay
Maxwell

McKnight
Neal
Peterson
Poole
Scarborough
Scott
Skinner
Steinberg
Stuart

Thomas
Tobiassen
Trask
Vogt
Ware
Williamson
Winn

Nays-2
Carlucci

Gordon

Votes after roll call:
Yea-Dunn, McClain, Myers, Spicola
SB 21-C-A bill to be entitled An act relating to a special election to be held on March 11, 1980, pursuant to
Section 5 of Article XI of the State Constitution, for the
approval or rejection by the electors of a joint resolution amending Section 3 of Article V of the State Consti-"
tution relating to the judiciary; providing for publication of notice and for procedures; providing an effective
date.
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-was read the second time by title. On motion by Senator Hair, by two-thirds vote SB 21-C was read the third
time by title, passed by the required constitutional
three-fourths vote of the membership and was certified to
the House. The vote on passage was:
Yeas-34
Mr. President
Anderson
Barron
Chamberlin
Childers, D.
Childers, W. D.
Fechtel
Frank
Gorman

Grizzle
Hair
Henderson
Hill
Holloway
Jenne
Johnston
MacKay
Maxwell

McKnight
Neal
Peterson
Poole
Scarborough
Scott
Skinner
Steinberg
Stuart

Thomas
Tobiassen
Trask
Vogt
Ware
Williamson
Winn

Nays-i

Carlucci
Votes after roll call:
Yes-Dunn, McClain, Myers, Spicola
APPENDIX D
September 13-15, 1979
The statement of principles adopted is set forth below.
Statement of Principles approved by the Board of Governors
of The Florida Bar, Saturday, September 15, 1979, in principle
1. The burden of decision making imposed by the current jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
is intolerable and this jurisdiction should be modified.
2. The committee would recommend consideration of support of a constitutional amendment
providing for mandatory jurisdiction for the Supreme Court to include no more than the
following:
a. When provided by general law, review of bond validation proceedings;
b. Review of cases where the death penalty is imposed;
c. Review of decisions of district courts of appeal declaring invalid a state statute or a provision of the state constitution.
3. The committee would recommend support of a constitutional amendment providing for
discretionary review by the supreme court of the following categories of cases:
a. Decisions of a district court of appeal expressly construing a provision of the federal or
state constitution;
b. Decisions certified by the district court of appeal as conflict cases, cases of great public
importance, or cases affecting the proper administration of justice;
c. Orders or judgments of the circuit or county court certified by the chief judge of a circuit
to be of great public importance or to affect the proper administration of justice and to
require an immediate resolution;
d. Decisions of a district court of appeal in which the opinion articulates a rule of law in
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conflict with the decision of another district court or the supreme court. (This would
contemplate no review of per curiam affirmances.)
e. Decisions of the district court of appeal which substantially affect the general public interest or the proper administration of justice throughout the state.
4. It is contemplated and recommended that the court by rule:
a. Sharply restrict the format and presentation of petitions for certiorari;
b. Require as a prerequisite to a petition for conflict cert that the question of conflict be
expressly raised in the district court of appeal;
c. Provide for en banc panels of the district courts.
Note: this statement of principles assumes adoption of the balance of the court's original
proposal for amendment of the other provisions of Article V, Section 3. The provision contained in this statement will be substituted for subsections 3(b)(1) through (8) and (7) of the
court's original proposal.
APPENDIX E
COMMISSION ON FLORIDA'S APPELLATE COURT STRUCTURE
MINUTES
October 12, 1978
The Commission on Florida's Appellate Court Structure met at 9:00 a.m. in the Collier
Room of the Host International Motel in the Tampa International Airport on October 12,
1978.
Members present: Justice Ben F. Overton, Chairman, Chief Judge Guyte P. McCord, Jr.,
Chief Judge Stephen H. Grimes, Judge Philip A. Hubbart, Chief Judge James C. Downey,
Judge Parker Lee McDonald, Judge Donald E. Stone, Judge Morton L. Abram, Commissioner
Arthur C. Canaday, Representative Arnett E. Girardeau, Representative William E. Sadowski,
Mr. William H. Adams, I, Mr. Thomas A. Clark, Mr. Charles B. Edwards, Mr. Jack
Kassewitz, Mr. Robert J. Pleus, Jr., and Mr. Tobias Simon.
Members not present: Senator Mattox Hair and Dean Richard Julin.
Others present: Sylvia Alberdi, Richard Cox, and Eleanor Mitchell.
COMMISSION BUSINESS
1. The Chairman stated that he believed the appropriate approach to the work of the Commission was for the full commission to make the necessary policy determinations and then
divide up into subcommittees for the purpose of drafting the specific constitutional, statutory
or rule changes necessary to implement the policy.
2. In response to questions which arose concerning the position of the Supreme Court on the
matters under consideration by the Commission, the Chairman indicated that he would
attempt to get a consensus of the Court's position prior to the next meeting, and that standing
invitations to meet with the Commission have been issued to each Supreme Court justice.
3. Mr. Simon stated that there were questions about policy which should be answered prior
to the collapse of the system. He noted that the Supreme Court was overloaded with an errorcorrecting function which unnecessarily impeded the Court's more appropriate role of policy
maker.
4. The Commission discussed the respective roles of the Supreme Court and District Courts
of Appeal in light of the Hoffman v. Jones decision and the general philosophy of the Supreme
Court in the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction.
5. Judge Grimes stated that the district courts should be given the right to sit en banc for the
purpose of avoiding internal inconsistency. The Commission, while noting that there is some
question over the constitutional right at the present time for the district courts to sit en banc,
agreed that the courts should possess such power.
6. The Commission next discussed the concept of the present system of certiorari jurisdiction in contrast to a completely discretionary certiorari system. The Chairman indicated that
there has always existed differing views within the Supreme Court concerning the concept of
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conflict jurisdiction and the function of such jurisdiction. Mr. Simon stated that the Supreme
Court should be given certiorari jurisdiction similar to that possessed by the United States
Supreme Court; that is, jurisdiction to decide significant and important cases. Judge Grimes
was of the opinion that discretionary certiorari may make the district courts less final. There
was disagreement among the members concerning the short and long term effects of such a
change in certiorari jurisdiction.
7. The Commission decided to review Supreme Court jurisdiction provision-by-provision,
noting that the tentative votes taken in relation to the matters discussed were subject to
change based on either a rethinking of the matter or consideration of the juridictional problems in the other courts in the system.
8. The Commission tentatively voted or agreed:
(a) to make no recommendations for changes in the present Supreme Court appellate
jurisdiction over death cases;
(b) to recommend that the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over decisions passing
on the validity of a state or federal statute be limited to those cases in which the state or
federal statute is declared invalid. (Cases in which the validity of the statute is upheld
would proceed along the normal appellate route; that is, to either the district court of
appeal or the circuit court, depending on the court of origin.);
(c) to recommend no change in the constitutional provision allowing appellate jurisdiction for decisions construing the state or federal constitution, in light of the fact that the
number of cases in the category was so small;
(d) to wait until after the proposed constitution revision vote in November before making any recommendation on the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over life
sentences imposed in capital cases;
(e) to recommend that bond validations remain within the Supreme Court appellate
jurisdiction;
(f) not to recommend changes in the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
cases involving a class of constitutional officers;
(g) to recommend that the Supreme Court retain certiorari jurisdiction over questions
certified by district courts to be of great public interest;
(h) to recommend no changes in the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over
interlocutory orders which upon becoming final would be directly appealable to the
Supreme Court.
(i) to remove from the Supreme Court's certiorari jurisdiction Industrial Relations
Commission (workmen's compensation) cases, if a viable alternative procedure for judicial
review of such cases is found;
(j) to remove Public Service Commission certiorari jurisdiction from the Supreme
Court if a viable alternative judicial review procedure for such cases is found, after a
lengthy discussion of the distinction between Public Service Commission cases of state-wide
import and those of local concern only.
9. The Chairman indicated that the matters on the agenda which were not covered at this
meeting would be discussed at the next meeting which was scheduled for October 26 in
Tampa. The Chairman also tentatively established November 16 and November 30 as future
meeting dates for the Commission.
MEMORANDUM RE
RECOMMENDATIONS OF APPELLATE STRUCTURE COMMISSION
Sept. 5, 1979
The Appellate Structure Commission reviewed the proposal by the Supreme Court for its
jurisdiction as contained in Appendix C of the Chief Justice's Report on the Florida Judiciary
and made the following recommendations:
I. The Commission had no objection to the proposed modification of the organization
of the Court as set forth in subparagraph (a) of section 3.
With reference to the specific jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the Commission would
modify the proposal in the following manner:
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MANDATORY JURISDICTION

1. Shall hear appeals from final judgments of trial courts imposing the death penalty;
2. Shall hear appeals from decisions of district courts of appeal which declare invalid a
state statute or a federal statute or treaty.
[It was the intent of the Commission that the Court should mandatorily review such holding
of invalidity irrespective of whether such holding was by a written opinion or-a per curiam
affirmed opinion.]

3. When provided by general law, shall hear appeals from final judgments entered in
proceedings for validation of bonds or certificates of indebtedness.
DISCRETIONARY OR PERMISSIVE JURISDICTION
1. May review by certiorari any decision of a district court of appeal which expressly

upholds the validity of a state statute or federal statute or treaty or expressly construes a
provision of the state or federal constitutions. The district court could if it deemed it

appropriate certify, in advance of decision, issues dealing with the validity of a state or
federal statute or a constitutional issue, and it would be discretionary in the Supreme
Court whether it would accept such advance certification.

[It was the understanding of the Commission that the use of the term "expressly" required a
written opinion by the district court.]

2. May review by certiorari any decision of a district court of appeal that passes upon a
question certified by a district court of appeal.
[It was the Commission's intent to eliminate the specific finding that such a question be of
great public interest. The Commission would eliminate the certification of direct conflict
questions and leave the issue of direct conflict to be dealt with by the last provision in this

recommendation.]
3. May review interlocutory orders passing upon a matter which, upon final judgment,
would be directly appealable to the Supreme Court.
4. May issue writs of prohibition to courts and all writs necessary to the complete
exercise of its jurisdiction.
5. May issue writs of mandamus and quo warranto to state officers and state agencies.
6. May or any justice may issue writs of habeas corpus returnable before the Supreme
Court or any justice, a district court of appeal or any judge thereof, or any circuit judge.
7. May review any order, judgment, or decision of a district court of appeal on an
issue or issues which substantially affect the general public interest or the proper administration of justice throughout the state.
[It would be the intention of the Commission that this provision would afford the Court an
opportunity to xeview conflicting decisions of the district courts of appeal, and the appropriate standard for review of such cases should be set forth in rules as previously proposed
by the Commission to the Court. The Commission opposed the "reach-down" provision as
proposed by the Court.]
APPENDIX F
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
JULY TERM, 1978
WEDNESDAY, JULY 26, 1978
AMENDED: TUESDAY, AUGUST 15, 1978
IN RE:
COMMISSION ON THE FLORIDA
APPELLATE COURT STRUCTURE
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER
In his 1978 Report on the State of the Judiciary, Chief Justice Ben F. Overton urged the
formation of a commission to study the present appellate -court structure of the state, with a
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view to recommending changes that may be necessary to meet the needs of the future. The
problems perceived by the Chief Justice earlier this year appear to be growing, and they
require prompt attention. This order is promulgated to implement Justice Overton's recommendation.
(a) Commission Members
The following individuals are appointed to serve as the Commission on the Florida Appellate Court Structure:
Ben F. Overton, Justice, as Chairman
Supreme Court of Florida
Tallahassee
Guyte P. McCord, Jr., Judge
First District Court of Appeal
Tallahassee
Stephen H. Grimes, Judge
Second District Court of Appeal
Lakeland
Philip A. Hubbart, Judge
Third District Court of Appeal
Miami
James C. Downey, Judge
Fourth District Court of Appeal
West Palm Beach
Parker Lee McDonald, Judge
Ninth Judicial Circuit
Orlando
Donald E. Stone, Judge
Eleventh Judicial Circuit
Miami
Morton L. Abram, Judge
Broward County
Arthur C. Canaday, Commissioner
Industrial Relations Commission
Tallahassee
Mattox S. Hair, Senator
Jacksonville
Arnett E. Girardeau, Representative
Jacksonville
William E. Sadowski, Representative
Miami
William H. Adams III, Esq.
Jacksonville
Thomas A. Clark, Esq.
Tampa
Charles B. Edwards, Esq.
Fort Myers
Joseph R. Julin, Dean
Gainesville
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Jack Kassewiti
Miami
Robert J. Pleus, Jr., Esq.
Orlando
Tobias Simon, Esq.
Miami

(b) Commission Functions
The Commission is directed to study the existing structure, case load, and operation of
Florida's appellate courts, and to recommend as promptly as possible such measures as are
deemed advisable to improve the quality of appellate justice and to promote the efficient
disposition of cases in the appellate courts. To achieve these goals, the Commission is directed
to review all relevant provisions of the Florida Constitution of 1968, as amended, all relevant
provisions of the Constitution proposed for adoption in November, 1978, all statutes affecting
the appellate jurisdiction of Florida's courts, and all relevant decisions defining or controlling
the appellate jurisdiction of Florida's courts. In carrying out its analysis and forming its
recommendations, the Commission is directed to evaluate the following subjects, along with
any others it deems appropriate:
(1) With respect to the appellate jurisdiction of circuit courts;
(a) the amalgamation of circuit and county courts;
(b) the alteration of statutory boundaries distinguishing the two; and
(c) the creation of panels of circuit court judges to review county court decisions.
(2) With respect to the district courts of appeal:
(a) the establishment of a statewide court of specialized appeals or, alternately, the
establishment of specialized appeals' divisions in the district courts of appeal;
(b) the alteration of the boundaries of the existing district courts of appeal or the
establishment of one or more additional district courts of appeal;
(c) the creation of additional judgeships in some or all of the district courts of appeal; and
(d) the absorption of Industrial Relations Commissioners into one or more of the
district courts of appeal, and the concomitant absorption of industrial claims judges into
the circuit courts.
(3) With respect to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the amendment or repeil of
constitutional and statutory provisions affecting the Court's jurisdiction, in an effort to
ensure that the district courts of appeal are courts of final appellate review as contemplated
by Article V of the Constitution.
The Commission is directed to convene at the call of the chairman as promptly as &3ossible,
and is requested to report its recommendations not later than February 28, 1979. Coordinative
staff support will be provided by the State Courts Administrator and the Administrative
Assistant to the Chief Justice.

Isl Arthur J. England, Jr.
Chief Justice
Attest:
/s/ Debbie Causseax
Deputy Clerk
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
JULY TERM, A.D. 1978
November 28, 1978
IN RE:

)

COMMISSION ON THE FLORIDA
APPELLATE COURT STRUCTURE

)
)

)
)
)
)
)

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER
The order of the Chief Justice originally establishing and setting forth the duties of the
Commission on the Florida Appellate Court Structure and appointing members, dated July 26,
1978, as amended on August 15, 1978, is amended to remove Senator Mattox Hair, at his
request, as a member of the Commission and to add Senator James A. Scott as a member of the
Commission.
It is so ordered.
Is/ Arthur J. England, Jr.
Chief Justice
Attest:
/s/ Sid White
Clerk
ADDENDUM
The following developments occurred as this article went to the printer:
Footnote 117: The Court's proposed revision of § 26.012(1), Florida Statutes (1979) - creating
a "statutory bypass" for the circuit courts in cases of county court invalidations- was passed
by the 1980 Legislature effective July 9, 1980. H.B. 1670 (Reg. Sess. 1980).
Footnotes 148, 158, 162: A bill to conform the statutory review authority over utility matters to
the 1980 amendment was passed by the 1980 Legislature effective July 1, 1980. S.B. 313 (Reg.
Sess. 1980).
Footnotes 187-189 and accompanying text: The court held in Dodi Publishing Co. v. Editorial
America, S.A., No. 59,042 (Fla. July 3, 1980), that a "citation PCA" does not provide a sufficient basis for conflict jurisdiction under new section 3(b)(3). In a companion case, Pena v.
Tampa Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, No. 59,153 (Fla. July 3, 1980), the court held that a district
court order summarily dismissing an appeal with a mere citation of authority also does not
support conflict jurisdiction.
Footnotes 246 & 247 and accompanying text: In Jenkins v. State, No. 59,987 (Fla. June 26,
1980), the court held that it lacked jurisdiction under new section 3(b)(3) to review, for
conflict purposes, district court per curiam decisions without opinion accompanied by a concurring or dissenting opinion. The 1980 amendment thus has abolished the concepts of
"dissent conflict" and "concurrence conflict."
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